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Marriage settlements are back. Complex trusts intended to protect family fortunes were
once the centerpiece of wedding planning and family negotiations. In more modern times, these
trust-based settlements ceded their popularity to premarital contracting and the prenuptial
agreement. But in recent years, new trust forms with unprecedented asset protection features
have prompted a resurgence of trust usage in marriage planning. Playing on notions of family
money and legacy building, these new trusts function much like their predecessors, except in
one noteworthy respect. Conventional trusts have always provided asset protection based on
the notion of third-party freedom of disposition. The new marriage trusts give asset protection
to trusts created by a first-party to the marriage. Accordingly, one spouse can create an asset
protection trust—for his or her exclusive benefit using what is potentially marital property—
without the knowledge of the other spouse. That individual spouses are seeking new ways to
protect wealth is not necessarily surprising. Nevertheless, the new powers being given to
individual spouses to shelter assets within marriage are alarming. In practice, the new trusts
are disconcerting because they allow for a significant amount of unilateral decision-making. In
theory, the new trusts are troubling because they disrupt the precarious equilibrium that exists
between two competing “value-spheres”: family wealth preservation and marital partnership.
This Article proposes a distinctive framework, based on the notion of competing value-spheres,
for assessing the growing phenomenon of asset protection trusts in marriage and concludes that
these trusts represent an aggressive incursion of wealth preservation into the realm of modern
marital partnership. That is to say, the new asset protection trusts undermine the values of
personal trust and financial transparency within marriage.
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TRUSTING MARRIAGE
Allison Tait*
I would have everybody marry if they can do it properly; I do not like to
have people throw themselves away; but everybody should marry as soon
as they can do it to advantage.
~ Jane Austen, Mansfield Park (1814)
Equity will not feed the husband and starve the wife.
~ Wetmore v. Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520, 529 (1896)
INTRODUCTION
Marriage settlements are back. Intricate trusts, especially popular with the
landed aristocracy in early modern England, were once an integral part of wedding
preparations and parental negotiations.1 Elaborate arrangements specified a bride’s
dowry and carved out a small amount of the estate for her widowhood.2 These
agreements also stipulated what assets would return to the spouse’s family of origin
at death if there were no heirs to carry on the family line.3 Building family fortunes
and protecting legacies was the name of the game. Furthermore, families routinely
took steps to insulate their assets from the reach of a spouse during marriage in case
the spouse turned out to be an unabashed spendthrift. Summing up this approach,
Samuel Johnson stated: “It is mighty foolish to let a stranger have [your estate]
because he married your daughter.”4
The trust, with its unique capacity for asset partitioning, was central to this
type of estate planning.5 The trust accommodated the desire of families to safeguard
their fortunes by allowing assets to be made available for the benefit of one spouse

* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond, School of Law. For comments and conversation,
I would like to thank Erez Aloni, Susan Appleton, Alex Boni-Saenz, Stephanie Bornstein, Naomi Cahn,
Jessica Clarke, Erin Collins, Bridget Crawford, James Dwyer, Jessica Erickson, Deborah Gordon,
Andrew Gilden, Meredith Harbach, Claudia Haupt, Mary Heen, Rana Jaleel, Corinna Lain, William
LaPiana, Serena Mayeri, Shari Motro, Luke Norris, Robert Pollak, Rachel Rebouche, Carla Spivack, Ed
Stein, Sarah Swan, and Lee-Ford Tritt. I benefitted greatly from panel participants at the Law and
Society 2017 Annual Conference, the 2017 Association for Law, Culture, and Humanities conference,
and SEALS 2017 panel on trusts & estates, as well as faculty workshop participants at Washington
University, William & Mary Law School and St. John’s University School of Law. For excellent research
and editorial assistance, I thank Amanda Bird and Michelle Fremen.
1. Christopher Clay, Marriage, Inheritance, and the Rise of Large Estates in England, 1660-1815,
21 ECON. HIST. REV. 503, 504 (1968).
2. H.J. Habakkuk, Marriage Settlements in the Eighteenth Century, 32 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 15, 20–21 (1950).
3. For discussion and debate on early-modern marriage settlements, see AMY LOUISE
ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 79–114 (1993); EILEEN SPRING,
LAW, LAND, AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN ENGLAND 1300 TO 1800, 123–48 (1993);
SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN’S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1833, Chapter 6
(1990); Clay, supra note 1, at 507, 510; Habakkuk, supra note 2, at 22.
4. JAMES BOSWELL, BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON 520 (1904).
5. On the use of trusts in these settlements, see generally LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE
SETTLEMENTS, 1601-1740 (1883).
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but not the other. Most commonly, a father created a trust for his child upon
marriage. However, there were many variations: an aunt with no husband or
children created a trust in her will for her favorite nephew or a grandfather created
a trust for a granddaughter as a wedding gift. The connecting thread was that a
family member created the trust with non-marital assets to benefit one spouse
during his or her marriage.
In the twentieth century, these elaborate marriage settlements passed out of
fashion, replaced by prenuptial agreements and premarital contracting.6 In the last
several decades, however, a new breed of asset protection trusts has proliferated
and revitalized the use of trusts in marital financial planning.7 And, as more and
more states modify traditional trust rules, new types of asset protection trusts appear
every day, playing on notions of family money and legacy building. Dynasty Trusts.8
Legacy Trusts.9 Millennium Trusts.10 There is a “Bloodline Trust.”11 And one trust
company even boldly markets a “Have Your Cake and Eat It Too” Trust (HYCET
Trust®).12 These trusts function much like their predecessors—except in one
noteworthy respect. The new marriage trusts allow one spouse acting alone to create
asset protection trusts for his or her personal benefit with assets that are potentially
marital property.

6. Prenuptial contracts are an alternate form of marriage settlement, and contracting has been
the more usual method of protecting assets within marriage starting in the twentieth century. The first
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act was introduced in 1983. Recent estimates suggest that between 35% of marrying couples have these kinds of contracts. Interesting Prenuptial Agreement Statistics (May
20, 2017), http://brandongaille.com/18-interesting-prenuptial-agreement-statistics [ perma.cc/2HZR3YMR ] (“Only 3% of people who have a spouse or are planning on getting married in the near future
have a prenuptial agreement.”).
7. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Beyond the Prenup: Families Increasingly Turn to Trust to Protect
Assets, Inheritances From Ex-Spouses, W ALL S TREET J. (Sept. 22, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB112735445722148247 [ perma.cc/6MYB-6QT8 ] (explaining that “[p]rotecting wealth from
the financial ravages of divorce has long been a key concern of families”).
8. The Dynasty Trust, WILMINGTON TR. CORP., https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/wtcom/
index.jsp?fileid=3000303 [ perma.cc/Z383-7CEV ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ) (explaining that “a
dynasty trust is an irrevocable trust designed so that it may stay in effect for multiple generations,
creating a powerful estate planning tool for high-net-worth families”).
9. Christopher Cline, Why Use Legacy Trusts, ABBOT DOWNING, https://www.abbot
downing.com/asset/ggckc8/LegacyTrusts.pdf [ perma.cc/MCZ3 - NCWL ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 )
(explaining that legacy trust is a term for any trust that last perpetually).
10. Trusts to Consider, PEAK TR. COMPANY, https://www.peaktrust.com/trustee/trusts-toconsider/ [ perma.cc/3TPQ-JA84 ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ) (explaining that “perpetual trust[s]
(Millennium Trust) provide for a long-term trust that saves estate and gift taxes while increasing the
family wealth, using Alaska jurisdiction”).
11. The Benefits of Bloodline Trusts Special Report, BEGLEY L. GROUP,
http://www.begleylawyer.com/2012/02/the-benefits-of-bloodline-trusts-special-report/ [ perma.cc/
UC2R-H9AY ] (last visited July 16, 2017 ) (explaining that a bloodline trust is designed to keep money
in the family protecting the inheritance of your children and their descendants).
12. Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Hycet Trust, JEFFERY M. VERDON L. GROUP, LLP,
http://jmvlaw.com/hycet-trust/ [ perma.cc/ABH4-AD4D ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ) [hereinafter
HYCET].
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That individual spouses are seeking new ways to protect family wealth is not
surprising. The new powers being given to spouses to shelter their own assets are,
nevertheless, decidedly problematic both in practice and in theory. In practice, the
new trusts are problematic because they allow for significant amounts of unilateral
decision-making by one spouse in terms of trust creation and management. This
unilateral decision-making authority may strip spouses of their rights by allowing
one spouse to create a trust with assets that are potentially marital property. In this
way, the new trusts financially endanger economically vulnerable spouses by
manipulating the marital estate and removing family law protections crafted to
address wealth and income asymmetries in marriage.13
In theory, the new marriage trusts are troubling because they disrupt the
current equilibrium—already precarious—between family wealth preservation and
marital partnership. In previous centuries, family wealth preservation, with its focus
on minimizing wealth passing to the surviving spouse and maximizing bloodline
inheritance, was the lodestar of all wealth management in marriage. In modern
marriage, however, norms concerning marriage and money have evolved and
economic partnership has replaced the duty of support as the conceptual
touchstone of marriage. Accordingly, the spouse is no longer ancillary to wealth
transmission and the idea of a surviving spouse inheriting the bulk of a married
couple’s wealth has become commonplace.14 As a result, family wealth preservation
values have been forced to compete and compromise with marital partnership
values in the regulation of the marital economy.
Put another way, as marital partnership has gained traction and become
increasingly embedded in marriage law, economic partnership and family wealth
preservation have come to represent two forceful and often competing “valuespheres,” each constituted by distinct ideals.15 Each value-sphere conceives of
wealth management and transfer differently, and each operates according to a
particular regulatory logic: money has a distinct meaning in each realm. That these
two different spheres exist is not an intractable problem; the landscape is replete
with different value-spheres, each regulating a particular slice of life. It is, however,
a problem when the rules of one value-sphere aggressively impose themselves on
another. This is exactly what is happening with the new trust forms. Because the
new marriage trusts not only facilitate spousal disinheritance but also enable this
asset stripping to happen at the hands of a spouse rather than a third party, the new
13. Traditionally, the lack of economic protections in marriage disproportionately affected
women and contributed to female impoverishment after divorce from or the death of a spouse. In many
instances, however, women are consumers of these new trusts, shielding assets from their husbands in
order to protect their own wealth. In addition, differences in income and wealth are also present in
same-sex marriages, rendering both men and women in these marriages vulnerable as well. From this
perspective, the gender of the economically vulnerable spouse is a secondary concern, although there
is surely more to say about how the role of “economically vulnerable spouse” is likely gendered female.
14. Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law
Provides a Solution, 49 UNIV. OF MIAMI L. REV. 567, 573 (1995).
15. See discussion infra Section I.C.
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marriage trusts represent an unwelcome incursion of family wealth preservation
rules into the sphere of marital partnership.
In tackling the problems created by these new marriage trusts, this Article
builds on several strands of scholarship. Scholars have addressed the gap between
the partnership theory of marriage and inheritance law in the context of the elective
share and Uniform Probate Code (UPC) reform.16 These scholars have examined
changes to probate rules and debated how well the new rules instantiate the value
of economic partnership, which the UPC claims as a guiding value. This project
shifts the theoretical focus from probate to trust law and subsequently looks at the
inherent value conflict between trust and family law. This Article also contributes
to an emerging body of scholarship analyzing recent developments in trust law, in
particular, the appearance of the latest asset protection trusts. In this vein, scholars
are addressing emergent legal questions related to domestic asset protection and
dynasty trusts, including questions about choice of law, fraudulent transfer, and
bankruptcy.17 Scholars are exploring the normative correctness of states authorizing
such trusts and the public policy questions involved.18 This Article threads together
these strands of scholarship in order to better understand how new trust forms are
impacting wealth transfer between couples and within families and what the proper
regulation of these trusts should be. Moreover, this Article proposes a distinctive
framework, based on the notion of competing value-spheres, for assessing the
current intervention of trust law into marriage law and concludes that first-party
trusts are an invalid incursion of wealth preservation into the realm of modern
marriage values.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part One provides a broad history of the
norms of family wealth planning and how they shifted in the latter half of the
twentieth century. This Part begins with a description of the ways in which estate
planning historically involved providing for heirs and gave little weight to spousal
rights. Subsequently, I discuss evolving social norms and legal rules within marriage
and the emergence of the partnership theory of marriage. After providing this
background, I introduce the concept of value-spheres and propose a framework for
analyzing the conflict between family wealth preservation and marital partnership
based on these value-spheres. Part Two begins with an analysis of the basic
16. See also Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce and Death, 4 UTAH
L. REV. 1227 (2005). See generally Gary, supra note 14, at 567 (1995).
17. See Nina Dow, The Hide and Seek of Creditors & Debtors: Examining the Effectiveness of
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts for the Massachusetts Settlor, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 170 (20132014); Charles D. Fox IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37 REAL PROP.,
PROB. AND TR. J. 287 (2002); Ronald Mann, A Fresh Look at State Asset Protection Trust Statutes, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1741 (2014); Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake
and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (1994-1995); Jay Soled & Mitchell Gans, Asset Preservation
and the Evolving Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2015); Stewart
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000);
R.W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The Estate Planning Tool of the Decade or a Charlatan, 13
BYU J. PUB. L. 163 (1998-1999).
18. See Carla Spivack, Beware the Asset Protection Trust, 5 EUR. PROP. L.J. 105 (2016).
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regulatory framework of marital trusts, how conventional forms operate to shelter
marital assets, and how marriage law currently strives to balance family wealth
preservation and marital partnership. Subsequently, I engage in an in-depth inquiry
into the new marriage trusts—how they came to be, how they work, and how they
are marketed—and analyze why they should provoke concern. I look in particular
at the Qualified Terminable Interest Property trust (QTIP) and the domestic asset
protection trust (DAPT). Following this discussion of the new marriage trusts, Part
Three proposes several ways to prevent the new trusts from disrupting the delicate
ecology of the marital economy, based on an understanding of what constitutes an
appropriate scope of power for first-parties to a marriage. Ultimately, this Article
suggests ways to balance the competing principles of family wealth preservation and
marital partnership in this brave new world of trust creation and proposes strategies
for creating a regulatory system that maintains the integrity of each value-sphere
while promoting fairness to all parties.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF MONEY AND MARRIAGE
The desire of families and fiancés to protect their assets from spouses and
soon-to-be spouses is not new; it constitutes part of a venerable tradition of family
wealth preservation. This Part provides a short historical overview of the norms of
family wealth management and the marital economy. I begin by describing
longstanding inheritance practices of keeping wealth within the family—that is, the
individual spouse’s family of origin—and how, only recently and due to major sociocultural shifts, new inheritance presumptions and norms have emerged favoring
spousal inheritance. Now, sharing norms are shaping marriage law. Nevertheless,
families are still using trust law to circumvent spouses in wealth transfer, and
traditional notions of family wealth preservation still drive a large part of estate
planning. Consequently, a conflict has arisen between current economic partnership
norms and the historical norm of family wealth preservation. I end this Part, then,
by analyzing the problem of conflicting norms and values and presenting a
theoretical frame for understanding conflict as well as reconciliation between these
competing value-spheres.
A. The Long Rule of Family Wealth Preservation
Marriage, historically, has not been a story of economic partnership. Rather,
marriage has been defined by economic dependence for the wife and a duty of
support for the husband. Spouses were not entitled to claim a great share of marital
wealth either during marriage or in widowhood, nor were they central to family
wealth transfer. Wealth transfer, instead, focused on family wealth preservation and
used planning documents, from trust-based marriage settlements to wills, to tie
wealth to family bloodlines.
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1. The Interrelation of Spousal Need and Family Wealth
Under coverture, a wife possessed a severely limited set of legal rights, and her
property rights, in particular, were highly constrained.19 Once a woman was married,
any property that the woman brought to the marriage came under the control of
her husband.20 All money, clothing, jewelry, furniture, and other personal goods
became the property of the husband, as did any leasehold land. A wife’s dowry, or
portion, also came under the control of her husband. A married woman retained
title to her freehold, and in theory, the husband could not dispose of it without her
consent. However, a wife had no right to any income the property produced.
In exchange for giving the bulk of her property interests over to her husband,
the husband was bound by a duty of support. Sir William Blackstone described the
duty as follows:
The husband is bound to provide his wife with the necessaries by law as
much as himself . . . . This duty to support her at his own home is by the
Common Law independent of any statute. If she leaves him of her own
accord the duty ceases. If he drive her away or fail to support her there, he
is liable to those who furnish her with necessaries, either individuals or
town authorities.21
Legal commentators and treatise writers were not always in agreement as to
what level of support the husband owed his wife; nevertheless, providing at least a
basic level of support was a clear marital duty.22
The duty of support, apart from marking the marital bargain, also signaled the
importance of another key value: family wealth preservation. A husband’s duty was
to enrich his family of origin, not his marital family, unless there was a son to carry
on the bloodline. Therefore, during marriage, a husband was not encouraged or
expected to give anything beyond maintenance to his wife. His wife was meant, in
her look and dress, to reflect his station in life and, therefore, to serve as a positive
attribute and ornament.23 However, the bulk of the husband’s estate was not to be
consumed but rather preserved for inheritance purposes—to keep the family estate,
name, and legacy intact.24

19. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550–57, 551 (4th
ed. 2005) (“Like most legal fictions it was not universally applicable.”). For an overview of the
complexity of coverture, see MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW: COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE
COMMON LAW WORLD (Tim Stretton & Krista Kesselring eds., 2013).
20. ERICKSON, supra note 3, at 24–25.
21. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. If a husband did not
provide for his wife, she had the right to charge in his name at stores run by sympathetic vendors and
the vendors had the right, subsequently, to recover their costs from the husband.
22. See generally Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to
an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Twila Perry, The Essentials
of Marriage: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2003).
23. STAVES, supra note 3, at 145–55.
24. Gary, supra note 14, at 571.
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Accordingly, just as a husband’s duty of support was circumscribed during
marriage, it was likewise limited at death. As one scholar has reminded us: “Prior to
this century, inheritance between spouses in Western Europe and the United States
was rare.”25 This was because “[m]arriage was not seen as a reason for shifting family
wealth, especially land, from one bloodline to another.”26 Marriage was meant to
create alliances and heirs. Accordingly, the widow rarely ever had anything more
than a life estate in the husband’s property. Ideally, there was a firstborn son who
would inherit the majority of the estate and take his place in the family line,
continuing the name and legacy of the husband’s family. After the widow’s death,
the husband’s property reverted back to his birth family if it did not go to the
couple’s children.27 As Susan Staves has commented: “[L]egal rules were motivated
more by desires to facilitate the transmission of significant property from male to
male and to ensure a basic level of protection for women and young children than
they were . . . in increasing the autonomy of married women.”28
2. A Widow’s Share: Duty After Death
The conventional, default method for provisioning the widow was dower.
Dower, also called “the widow’s share,” was “a moral obligation developed to
secure maintenance for a wife upon her husband’s death.”29 Dower was a property
right that the bride acquired upon marriage in exchange for her other lost property
rights and generally consisted of a life estate in one-third of the husband’s freehold
estate.30 Dower rights extended back at least to the Magna Carta, which stated that
“the wife and children were entitled to their ‘reasonable parts,’”31 conventionally
interpreted to mean one-third of the husband’s real and personal property.32
The dower right vested on the husband’s death33 and was intended to sustain
a widow through her old age.34 Because dower was intended solely as a mean of
support in old age, the widow was entitled to nothing more than the lifetime use
and enjoyment of whatever assets were designated for her support. She did not

25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 239
(1989)).
27. Gary, supra note 14, at 571.
28. STAVES, supra note 3, at 221–22.
29. Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: The Kingdom of the Fathers, 10 LAW & INEQ. 137,
146 (1991) (explaining that men had a right to curtesy and a life estate in all the lands even if there
wasn’t a child).
30. Often, a bride’s dowry was calculated in relation to the amount of her dower.
31. Carole Shammas, English Inheritance Law and Its Transfer to the Colonies, 31 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 145, 146 (1987).
32. Fellows, supra note 29, at 146.
33. SPRING, supra note 3, at 40; see OWEN DAVIES TUDOR, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES
ON REAL PROPERTY, CONVEYANCING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND DEEDS 42
(Butterworths 1856).
34. STAVES, supra note 3, at 45. Commentators also described the widow as possessing a “moral
right” to dower. Id.
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possess the right to sell, gift, or devise any of the property. Widowhood meant
receiving a maintenance allowance “without any right to the ownership of capital.”35
Moreover, this lifetime right was subject to various factors and depended on “local
custom, and if her husband was a copyholder, the approval of the lord. Her right to
realty, usually a third of it, extended for life on some manors and only during
widowhood or ‘as long as she remained chaste’ on others.”36
Even with all of its limitations on a widow’s financial interests, dower was still
frequently contested because of competing claims to the land in question and
complications if the widow remarried. For these reasons, among others, dower was
often unpopular and critics abounded. Janet Loengard observed that “dower
invoked conflicting sentiments” because, on the one hand, “[i]t was proper that a
woman should have enough to live on and bring up her children after her husband
died.”37 On the other, dower “ran counter to the strong desire, countenanced by
the family structure of feudal England, to keep landholdings undivided and in the
hands of the heir.”38 Provisioning of widows through dower was therefore not only
restricted to a maintenance obligation but also subject to manipulation and
contestation by husbands and heirs.
These contestations clarified that the rights of widows to family property were
tolerated, at best, and that widows were often perceived as dependents “whose
needs take assets away from the heroic job of accumulation.”39
B. The Shift to Economic Partnership
The norms of dower, support, and family wealth preservation had prodigious
traction and were the prevailing template for marital wealth transfer until well into
the twentieth century. Spurred in particular by seismic changes in social and cultural
norms in the 1960s and 1970s, the predominance of the duty of support and other
coverture values finally began to fade. In their place, notions of economic
partnership, household contributions, and asset sharing within marriage became
increasingly important values in marriage law.40 This Section details the shift.
1. Equitable Distribution as Economic Partnership
The explicit legal concept of economic partnership in marriage first emerged
in the latter half of the twentieth century, primarily in conjunction with the decline
of fault divorce and the ascendancy of equitable distribution. The idea of equitable
distribution arose in policy papers and reports as early as 1963. In that year’s Report

35. Fellows, supra note 29, at 150.
36. Shammas, supra note 31, at 147.
37. Janet S. Loengard, Of the Gift of Her Husband: English Dower and Its Consequences, in the
Year 1200, in WOMEN OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 254 ( Julius Kirshner & Suzanne F. Wemple eds.,
Oxford 1985).
38. Id.
39. STAVES, supra note 3, at 203.
40. Gary, supra note 14, at 573
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of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the President’s Commission on the
Status of Women, the authors observed:
Marriage as a partnership in which each spouse makes a different but
equally important contribution is increasingly recognized . . . . During
marriage, each spouse should have a legally defined substantial right in the
earnings of the other, in the real and personal property acquired through
those earnings, and in their management.41
Seven years later, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act introduced the idea
of equitable distribution. Aligned with the idea that fault was not to be a factor in
either granting the divorce or awarding property, the prefatory note to the Act stated
that property distribution at divorce was to be treated, as nearly as possible, “like
the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership.”42 Equitable
distribution was designed specifically to address the problems inherent in the
position of a homemaker upon divorce and to reward homemakers for their
nonmonetary contributions to the marriage.43
California was the first state to enact no-fault divorce in 1970, spurring other
states to do the same.44 Change was not, however, particularly fast. It took decades
for the majority of states to enact equitable distribution statutes. New York passed
an equitable distribution law in 1980.45 By 1983, twenty-two states had adopted
similar statutes,46 and by 2016, all states had adopted either equitable distribution or
community property principles, and state legislatures had eliminated all title-based
systems, generally embracing the idea of economic partnership within marriage.47
State courts, interpreting equitable distribution statutes in the course of
divorce litigation, also moved towards institutionalizing the principle of marriage as
an economic partnership. In Rothman v. Rothman (1974), the New Jersey Supreme
Court observed: “Thus the division of property upon divorce is responsive to the
concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways

41. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
47 (1963).
42. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. § 307, 309 (1973).
43. See Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution
of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279, 286 (1989).
44. See Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 31 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (noting
California was first state to abolish traditional fault-based grounds for divorce and to substitute factual
finding of marriage breakdown in their place, and California no-fault divorce law became effective in
1970 in context of community-property marital regime).
45. Henry H. Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981).
46. Mary Zeigler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of Marital-Property Reform,
19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 261 (2013) (“Equitable property division, rare in 1970. Became the
norm in all but ten states by the mid-1980s. Whereas no states had property-division rules recognizing
the contributions of homemakers in 1968, 22 states had adopted such a policy by 1983.”).
47. In this remainder of this paper, I address only separate property states. In community
property states, the landscape is quite different because both spouses have an immediate claim to certain
forms of property even during marriage. I put aside that analysis for a different venue.
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it is akin to a partnership.”48 And as an increasing number of states began to adopt
equitable distribution statutes and state courts began to evaluate cases under these
statutes, marriage as economic partnership became a mantra.49 Just over ten years
after Rothman, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: “[O]ur Equitable
Distribution Act . . . . reflects the idea that marriage is a partnership enterprise to
which both spouses make vital contributions and which entitles the homemaker
spouse to a share of the property acquired during the relationship.”50 The idea of
marriage as an economic partnership became, over the last decades of the twentieth
century, the guiding value of divorce law.
2. The Broader Embrace of the Marital Unit
The major reforms in divorce law that resulted to the embrace of equitable
distribution rules had a number of ripple effects. In particular, inheritance law began
to transform in order to match the advances made in spousal rights at divorce.
Beginning in 1969, UPC drafters began to address ways to bolster the elective share
(the modern version of dower) and “the position of the surviving spouse . . . steadily
improved everywhere at the expense of the decedent’s blood relatives.”51 In 1990,
seeking to address the growing strength of the economic partnership theory—and
to equalize results for spouses at both divorce and death, so as to not provide less
advantage at death than at divorce—the drafters of the UPC revisions took explicit
steps to move the UPC toward economic partnership.
This move was, again, most visible in the changes made to the elective share.52
The drafters stated:
The main purpose of the [elective share] revisions is to bring elective-share
law into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic
partnership. The economic partnership theory of marriage is already
implemented under the equitable distribution system applied in both the
common-law and community-property states when a marriage ends in
divorce.53
Implementing economic partnership meant redesigning the augmented estate
and providing the surviving spouse with one half rather than one third of the
48. Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 1974).
49. See, e.g., Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Haw. 1986) (“These decisions are
consistent with the time-honored proposition that marriage is a partnership to which both partners
bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”).
50. White v. White, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831–32 (N.C. 1985).
51. Glendon, supra note 22, at 238.
52. EXEC. COMM. OF THE NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS
TO UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 1 (2008) (the drafters explicitly stated that “[t]he main purpose of the
revisions is to bring the elective share into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic
partnership”).
53. Id. (“The partnership theory of marriage, sometimes also called the marital-sharing theory,
is stated in various ways. Sometimes it is thought of ‘as an expression of the presumed intent of
husbands and wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share and share alike . . . . Sometimes the
theory is expressed in restitutionary terms.”).
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decedent’s estate.54 Because of these changes, Mary Ann Glendon has stated: “In
the United States, the surviving spouse has clearly become the favorite in
inheritance.”55
At the same time the drafters made changes to the elective share, they also
made changes to the intestacy rules and increased the surviving spouse’s share of
the decedent’s estate. Based on new understandings about the presumed intent of a
decedent, the UPC drafters granted the surviving spouse the whole of the intestate
estate, if neither spouse had children from a previous relationship. This change, like
the changes to the elective share, was made to bring inheritance law “into line with
developing public policy and family relationships.”56
The norm of marital partnership also spilled over into other related domains.
Tax law, as early as 1948, introduced the idea of marital partnership with the joint
return. Building on this, in 1981, Congress implemented the norm of marriage as
an economic partnership into the tax code by approving an unlimited marital
deduction. One scholar has remarked:
The unlimited marital deduction reflected a decision to treat a husband and
wife as one unit for the purposes of transfer taxation, a decision which
paralleled the choice of the married couple as the proper unit for income
taxation and solidified the concept that a husband and wife’s property is
really “theirs.”57
In 2012, this concept of the marital unit was strengthened even further with
the introduction of portability, allowing one spouse to transfer his or her estate tax
exemption to the surviving spouse. The unlimited marital deduction and portability
have solidified the “legal fiction” of the married couple as “an irreducible economic
unit,” and this notion has “become a first principle of taxation that is now deeply
embedded in tax law and policy.”58
In the majority of legal domains dealing with married couples, law and policy
makers have attempted to instantiate the principle of partnership such that
economic partnership in marriage has become—over the latter half of the twentieth
century—the cornerstone of marriage law architecture. This has held true even as
marriage has evolved, blended families formed upon second marriage have become
the norm, and same-sex marriage has thrown gender roles into question.

54. While death and divorce are the two main mechanisms for termination a marriage, it is clear
that they differ. UPC drafters, however, sought to incorporate partnership language not to mirror
divorce but to make it such that the rewards and incentives for loyalty in marriage were not less than
those offered by divorce law.
55. Glendon, supra note 22, at 242.
56. Unif. Probate Code Art. II, Part 1 Note (1990).
57. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women,
5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 308 (1995) (noting that at the same time, Congress enacted the QTIP).
58. See Lily Khang, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The Taxation of Women in Same-Sex
Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 330 (2016).
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Partnership has replaced dependency as a marital ideal in both legal and
social expectation.59
C. A Tale of Two Value-Spheres
The shift from family wealth preservation to economic partnership as the
touchstone value in marriage and inheritance law has not been a minor sideways
shift. This change represents a profound shift in perspective, in particular
concerning the role of the surviving spouse in wealth transfer. Family wealth
preservation—a mode that emphasizes providing marginal resources to the spouse
and favoring heirs—and marital economic partnership represent two distinctly
different ways of looking at family relations, wealth transfer, and the marital
economy. Each mode conceives of resource management and distribution quite
differently and within each mode a particular legal infrastructure supports the
project. Trust law primarily supports family wealth preservation just as marriage law
primarily supports economic partnership, and the two modes often encompass
separate asset management strategies that are in tension with one another.
This mapping of differing modes of inquiry and sets of values—along with
their related forms of resource management and asset distribution—has a
conceptual basis in both sociology and philosophy. Max Weber set forth the idea of
“value-spheres” in the early 1910s in his work, Intermediate Reflections (Religious
Rejections of the World and Their Directions), in which he identified various distinct
social realms, each with its own modular set of values and norms. These spheres
ranged from economic, political, aesthetic, erotic, and intellectual, and according to
Weber, “the various value-spheres stand in irreconcilable conflict with each
other.”60 Each sphere, Weber argued, had an inner logic that conflicted with the
inner logic of the others. The religious sphere was, in his schema, inescapably in
conflict with the economic sphere because each sphere valued goods and ideas
59. Partnership may, of course, mean different things and the cultural meaning of marital
partnership has certainly evolved over time. The meaning of partnership invoked at divorce is primarily
economic in the sense that all contributions to the marriage should be valued. Partnership, in many
modern marriages, has become a deeper value in the sense that both partners contribute equally to most
undertakings. Naomi Cahn and June Carbone describe this mew model of partnership: “This model
rests on a new social script: a script that replaces women’s dependence on their husbands with spousal
interdependence . . . . It eliminates mutually exclusive roles assigned entirely by gender . . . most critically,
it assumes joint responsibility – for both the family finances and any resulting children.” NAOMI CAHN
& JUNE CARBONE, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY
93 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014). This social script contrasts with the “gender-full” marriages that
concerned divorce courts in the 1970s and may be more representative of not only different but also
same-sex marriages. Abbie E. Goldberg, “Doing” and “Undoing” Gender: The Meaning and Division of
Housework in Same-Sex Couples, 5 J. FAM. THEORY & REV. 85, 88 (2013). Accordingly, the “social
script” of partnership of marriage has not only persisted but become increasingly complex in meaning
as it has become embedded in the social imagination.
60. Max Weber, Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions, in FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (Hans Heinrich Gerth & Charles Wright Mills ed. & trans., 1991);
RICHARD SWEDBERG & OLA AGEVALL, THE MAX WEBER DICTIONARY: KEY WORDS AND
CENTRAL CONCEPTS (2nd ed. 2016) (Stanford Univ. Press 2005).
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differently. This proliferation of value-spheres led, in Weber’s estimation, to
“polytheism” and value fragmentation, forcing individuals to choose among a
plurality of narratives and modes.61
This notion of plurality and spheres carried over into Michael Walzer’s
concept of spheres of justice.62 In his seminal work, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of
Pluralism and Equality, Walzer states that there are various spheres of value and
meaning that operate in the world and that each sphere not only conceives of goods
differently but also distributes those goods in a way unique to that sphere.63 Goods
can exist in multiple spheres, but in each sphere the good takes on a particular
meaning. Bread, for example, means something different in the spheres of the
marketplace, the home, and a place of worship.64 Moreover, not only does meaning
change between spheres, so does what constitutes appropriate behavior and
resource distribution. Accordingly, “[m]oney is inappropriate in the sphere of
ecclesiastical office . . . [a]nd piety should make for no advantage in the marketplace,
as the marketplace has commonly been understood.”65 There is not, then, one single
standard of appropriate distribution or regulation; rather, “there are
standards . . . [in] every distributive sphere.”66 These different spheres exist
synchronously, like the marketplace and the temple. They can also exist in the same
domain but across historical moments since “[s]ocial meanings are historical in
character; and so distributions, and just and unjust distributions, change over
time.”67
The fact that multiple spheres exist simultaneously is not necessarily
problematic. In fact, Walzer argues that the existence of a number of spheres is
beneficial, because it allows for plural values to co-exist and even flourish without
the values of one sphere dominating the others. Multiple spheres are, for Walzer,
key to the formation and maintenance of a healthy, pluralistic society. Problems do
occur, however, when one sphere attempts to assert the rules of that sphere, and
thereby its dominance, in a separate and distinct realm.68 As an example, Walzer
invokes a surgeon who “claims more than his equal share of wealth”69 based not on
his skill as a surgeon but his social class or his educational background. When the
rules meant to govern one distribution scheme begin to govern other schemes, the
result is a form of tyranny. As Blaise Pascal stated: “The nature of tyranny is to

61.
62.

Id.
See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 8.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9.
68. This description of the problem relies on Blaise Pascal, who in his Pensées wrote that “[t]he
nature of tyranny is to desire power over the whole world and outside its own sphere.” Id. at 19.
69. Id. at 17.
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desire power over the whole world and outside its own sphere.”70 When this
happens, plurality and complex equality fail.
This theory of value-spheres lays the groundwork for a rich understanding of
the distinctive modalities of family wealth management and marital partnership,
where they co-exist and where they compete. To begin, the two value-spheres of
family wealth preservation and marital partnership co-exist as two particular
historical idioms within marriage law. That is to say, family wealth preservation and
economic partnership represent two stages of historical evolution in the social
meaning and legal management of marriage. And, because the transition from older
to newer is incomplete, elements of family wealth preservation still inhere in
marriage law. The two sets of values are in tension based on change over time.
Marriage law has, however, found a way to maintain some internal boundaries
between these two value sets, thereby allowing them to co-exist in relative accord
and allowing for the due consideration of both families and spouses.
Marriage law does this by allowing family wealth preservation, but based
primarily on notions concerning the donor’s right to gift property and freedom of
disposition. For example, the most well-known exception to marital property is that
gifts and bequests to one spouse from a third party, such as a parent, are considered
the separate property of the recipient even within marriage.71 Third parties—
parents, grandparents, any relative with financial means and generous impulses—
can give gifts, including the beneficial ownership of a trust interest without that gift
becoming marital property. Accordingly, most trust interests are generally not
marital property nor are they included in calculations for spousal support unless the
recipient has a present and enforceable interest—and sometimes not even then.72
The limiting principle is that the gifted assets come from and are gifted by a third
party, thereby exempting them as marital property because the assets are not a
product of a collective spousal effort or the “active labor, skill, or industry of either
spouse.”73 Within the sphere of marriage, then, historical marriage law, essentially
family wealth preservation, coexists—sometimes a little precariously—with modern
marriage law, which focuses on partnership.
In addition to this internal tension, the value-spheres of family wealth
preservation and marital partnership are also in external tension in the
contemporary legal setting as they operate within the fields of trust and marriage
law. While family wealth preservation, as a historical value, continues to inform and
shape marriage law to some degree, family wealth preservation continues to be the
guiding—some might say core—value in trust law. Family money, therefore, means

70. Id. at 15.
71. In addition, soon-to-be spouses can contract around almost all marital property rules if they
so choose in ante-nuptial agreements, that courts tend to uphold unless formed under circumstances
of extreme duress or coercion. For discussion of these rules, see Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and
Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate Property, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623 (2008).
72. For further discussion of these rules, see infra Section II.A.2.
73. See Motro, supra note 71, at 1637.
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something entirely different in the domain of trust law than it does in the domain
of marriage law. The advent of the new marriage trusts has highlighted this conflict
between the value-spheres of trust and marriage law, just as it has underscored the
ways in which conflict between value-spheres can be disruptive and harmful.
The new trust rules, in particular, unsettle the precarious equilibrium between
family wealth preservation and marital partnership by transgressing the of
third-party involvement. Whereas the current stasis between the value-spheres is
based on assets being exempt only when a third party gifts those assets, the new
trusts allow one spouse to create a trust and shelter assets from the other. No longer
is the donor a parent, relative, or even generous friend. This time, the donor is a
direct member of the marital partnership. And this partner is authorized to create a
trust and fund it with potential marital assets without having a conversation with,
or even necessarily notifying, the other marital partner. The new marriage trusts,
consequently, represent an aggression upon marital partnership and constitute an
overreaching attempt by family wealth values to exert authority over resource
distribution within marriage.
II. MODERN MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS
Marriage, and the creation of a new household, has historically been an
important moment for financial negotiation and asset structuring because marital
property rights intersect with the finances of both spouses and their families of
origin. Trusts have traditionally played a key role in this planning, prized for their
ability to protect assets from creditors, including spouses. In this Part, I describe
how trust forms, both old and new, are put to use in marriage and family wealth
planning as spouses seek to limit their personal financial liability—as well as the
financial liability of their families of origin—within marriage. First, I explore
something old: how the traditional forms of trust have successfully kept assets out
of the control of spouses, both at death and divorce, based on notions of donor
freedom. I subsequently describe the solutions, based on notions of control and
ownership equivalence, which uniform law offers to this problem of asset sheltering
in marriage. Lastly, I analyze something new: how the new marriage trusts provide
heightened levels of asset protection by giving spouses themselves the power to
form asset protection trusts. In this realm, there are few suggestions or models for
legal solutions to the problem of fraud on marital property, as there are with
conventional trusts.
A. Something Old: The Enduring Utility of Trusts
Trusts have long been a mechanism for sheltering assets from a beneficiary’s
creditors, including spouses. The hallmark of these asset protection trusts has always
been that third parties created them or, if created by the spouse, that they were
irrevocable and the settlor-spouse had given up all control over the assets. Both
historically and currently, less control generally equals more asset protection.
Current marriage law has attempted to maintain and enforce these boundaries in
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order to permit certain forms of family wealth preservation while creating equity
within marriage. Given the patchwork of state laws, however, certain imbalances
persist, and some state laws clearly favor family wealth preservation. Nevertheless,
as this Section demonstrates, marriage law, as well as uniform probate and trust law,
offers solutions to equalize the power of the two competing value-spheres.
1. Death: Trusts and the Widow
The property rights of surviving spouses have always been some of the most
important and deeply entrenched marital inheritance rights. The elective share,
based on old dower rules, is the default method of provisioning a widow and is a
widow’s insurance against disinheritance. If the decedent spouse makes no
provisions for his surviving spouse—or if he even disinherits her—she can still elect
against his estate after his death, taking anywhere from one third to one half of the
estate. Trusts, however, have always complicated the story and helped the decedent
spouse keep money out of the hands of the surviving spouse at death. Trusts, used
in this way, facilitate spousal disinheritance and exemplify an ethos of family wealth
preservation.
a. “No Dower of a Trust” and the Life Estate
Two features primarily defined the dower right in its basic historical form: the
use of the probate estate, excluding trusts, as the measure of the estate and the
limitation to a lifetime interest. Trusts—both historically and still currently, in some
states—allow one spouse to undermine the elective share rights of the other spouse
and also restrict the surviving spouse’s property rights to a life estate.
Under conventional rules, there was “no dower of a trust”74 because trusts
took the assets out of the husband’s probate estate. Consequently, a husband could
place his lands in trust and thereafter the land was no longer subject to dower
claims.75 Trusts were thought to be particularly useful in this respect because a
widow’s dower was considered to be a “great clog to alienations.”76 Furthermore,
some commentators believed that dower was also inconvenient because it was “too
generous to women.”77 Detractors reasoned that “it was inappropriate for a ‘young
woman of little or no fortune’ to get one-third of the estate of a wealthy groom.”78
The enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1536 was intended to end the practice of

74. STAVES, supra note 3, at Chapter 2.
75. In the preamble to the Statute of Uses, concern for defrauded widows barred from dower
by the rule concerning uses is mentioned as one reason for enacting the statute.
76. SPRING, supra note 3, at 48 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 137); see also STAVES, supra note 3, at 32. Landowners argued “dower made land titles
uncertain because a purchaser was exposed to the risk that a widow of some remote prior owner would
demand her dower from the subsequent purchaser upon that remote owner’s death.” Fellows, supra
note 29, at 147.
77. Fellows, supra note 29, at 147.
78. Id.
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using trusts to strip a widow of her dower rights.79 Nevertheless, landowners
continued to find ways to use trusts to keep assets safe from creditor spouses.80
It was not until 1969 that the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) replaced dower
and curtesy (the surviving husband’s entitlement) with the gender-neutral statutory
elective share for the surviving spouse.81 The elective share in most states provided
almost exactly what dower had—the right to one-third of the decedent spouse’s
probate estate. And the surviving spouse’s elective share could still be substantially
defeated by the use of a trust. The 1969 version of the UPC attempted to deal with
this problem, which the drafters called spousal disinheritance or “fraud on the
spousal share,” by adopting the concept of the augmented estate,82 or a probate
estate that is “augmented” with certain non-probate assets over which the decedent
spouse had control. With each revision the UPC has taken additional steps to
safeguard the elective share from fraud by refining how the augmented estate works
and what assets it captures. Nevertheless, in many states, trusts can still successfully
transfer assets out of the probate estate and, consequently, out of reach of the
surviving spouse.
Trusts have also been used to ensure that the surviving spouses did not have
more than a life estate in the decedent spouse’s estate. With dower, trusts were
unnecessary, as dower was never anything more than a life estate. Widows were to
receive small maintenance sums that reflected both the husband’s desire to preserve
money for the heir as well as the general belief that women lacked the “rationality
required for the active management of property.”83 When property came to the
widow outside of dower, trusts were frequently used to make sure that she had no
more than a life estate and that the remainder went to the heir or back to the family
of origin.
Ultimately, dower and the elective share are security for the surviving spouse
against disinheritance and impoverishment; public policy measures put in place to
keep widows minimally resourced through private channels. Nevertheless, in the
name of family wealth preservation, the trust has a long history of undermining
these protections in order to preserve an even greater share of assets for family and
heirs.
b. The Elective Share: Still Cheating the Probate Estate
Despite consistent improvements made by the UPC to stem spousal
disinheritance and counterbalance family wealth preservation, state law still varies
greatly on whether assets held in trust are includable in calculating the surviving
79. SPRING, supra note 3, at 47.
80. See SPRING, supra note 3, at 48; STAVES, supra note 3, at 37–49.
81. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-113. Some states still have dower rights, but they are statutory.
See Gary, supra note 14, at 575.
82. The duty of support continues in modern marriage law; it is now gender-neutral. See June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925 (2015).
83. STAVES, supra note 3, at 226.
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spouse’s elective share. When assets in trust are not included, the decedent spouse
can transfer substantial assets in trust before death to someone other than the
surviving spouse and prevent the surviving spouse from reaching these assets. In
other words, the “no dower of a trust” rule has not gone away.
A substantial minority of states still limit the elective share to one third of the
probate estate, without adding in—or “augmenting”—the probate estate with any
nonprobate transfers. Surviving spouses in these states have an uphill battle
contesting the exclusion of nonprobate transfers and, ultimately, decedents have the
ability to not only funnel assets to their heirs and other family members but also to
effectively disinherit spouses.
In a 2011 case from Wyoming, for example, the state supreme court concluded
that a surviving spouse was not allowed to reach assets transferred via revocable
inter vivos trust for purposes of calculating the elective share. “Simply put,” the
court remarked, “the Wyoming Probate Code does not incorporate the augmented
estate concept.”84 The Supreme Court of Alabama likewise, in Russell v. Russell,
concluded that a surviving wife had no right to include assets transferred by her
husband through an inter vivos revocable trust in the determination of her elective
share. The court stated that, “in enacting its Probate Code in 1982, Alabama rejected
the UPC’s augmented-estate concept . . . . Thus, we have no statutory authority for
the proposition that a surviving spouse is entitled to a share of assets that were
validly transferred by the decedent during his lifetime.”85 The husband was able to
transfer the bulk of his estate, consisting primarily of shares in the family business,
to a trustee, leaving only the very minimal residue of his estate to his wife.86
In these states, the decedent spouse can shield assets from the reach of a
surviving spouse using even revocable trusts, one of the most basic estate planning
tools. These states prioritize preserving the estate plan of the decedent and, by
implication, family wealth preservation at the expense of martial partnership.
c. Designing a Better Augmented Estate
Other states, to the benefit of surviving spouses, have decided to include
certain non-probate assets in calculating the elective share, thereby creating an
“augmented” estate. One approach has been to list the includable assets in the
statute. In states that take an enumerated approach, like Iowa, problems arise when
the asset is not listed.87 An alternate approach, taken by the UPC, is to leave the

84. In re Estate of George, 2011 WY 157, ¶ 44, 265 P.3d 222, 230 (Wyo. 2011) (The husband
had, through the trust, provided for the family business to pay a small annual salary to his widow and
to maintain her health insurance. The wife received some voting stock in the company—the trustee,
however, was the one authorized to vote her stock.).
85. Russell v. Russell, 758 So. 2d 533, 538 (Ala. 1999), overruled by Oliver v. Shealey, 67 So. 3d
73 (Ala. 2011).
86. Id. at 534.
87. In re Estate of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Iowa 2012) (concerning whether a payable-ondeath account was includable).
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particular assets unspecified and determine in each instance whether the decedent
retained “dominion and control” over the assets.88
The UPC model for the elective share—designed to reflect marital
partnership—offers a clear way forward in the ongoing effort to temper the force
of family wealth preservation in marriage. In states that follow the UPC approach,
trusts over which the decedent had control cannot defeat the elective share.89 Family
wealth preservation is still possible, especially using irrevocable trusts to transfer
assets to heirs. Nevertheless, UPC rules limit the opportunity for aggressive family
wealth preservation and provide a model for those states looking to balances the
equities of family wealth preservation and marital partnership based on the concept
of control.
2. Divorce: Hiding Money in Plain Sight
Trust forms also serve to limit one spouse’s interest in the other’s wealth at
divorce. The separate estate—the original self-settled asset protection trust—
facilitated asset protection for women and their families actually within marriage,
before married women were able to own property. After the separate estate,
discretionary and spendthrift trusts were used to the same effect for family wealth
holders. In this Section, I begin with a discussion of how these basic asset protection
trusts have been used as a standard tool for family wealth preservation. I conclude
this Section with an analysis of a recent divorce case that provoked great debate in
Massachusetts and that clearly demonstrates not only the value of discretionary
trusts in shielding assets, but also the strong and continuing importance of thirdparty donor rights.
a. The Return of the Separate Estate
The separate estate was a trust that existed as early as the sixteenth century in
England and allowed married women to own and control property during
marriage.90 Married women could own property in these trusts because the wives
held equitable, and not legal title, to the assets held in trust. Because a married
woman did not possess legal ownership of the assets, they were subsequently not
available to creditors including husbands. The separate estate was a valuable tool
for families and women who wanted to protect their assets from the financial

88. The Uniform Probate Code elective share section therefore specifies that the augmented
estate is composed of (1) the decedent’s net probate estate; (2) the decedent’s non-probate transfers to
others; (3) the decedent’s non-probate transfers to the surviving spouse; and (4) the surviving spouse’s
property and non-probate transfers to others. All of these assets are aggregated, and the surviving
spouse’s share is then taken from the “marital property” portion of this augmented estate. GARY, supra
note 14, at 585–86; Raymond O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share,
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 633 (2010).
89. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-210 to -214.
90. Allison Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM. 165 (2014).
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vagaries of a new husband and circumvent the property-based disabilities imposed
on married women by coverture.91
A bride’s family could establish a separate estate trust for her benefit before
or during marriage. Before marriage, parents generally established a separate estate
for the bride as part of the marriage planning. During marriage, wives frequently
became the beneficiaries of separate estate trusts through bequests made by family
members.92 In addition, women could establish these trusts for themselves as long
as they did so before marriage. Accordingly, women often created separate estates
for themselves in anticipation of second marriages, using their jointure or widow’s
share from the first marriage.93 The separate estate was, in this way, the original selfsettled asset protection trust, as well as an early planning tool for blended families.
With a separate estate, women could protect assets for the benefit of children from
the first marriage in order to keep these offspring from being dependent on the
largesse of a stepparent.
The separate estate declined in use and utility as legislatures began enacting
Married Women’s Property Acts in both England and America.94 Once married
women could own property during marriage, the immediacy of need for financial
protection within marriage dissipated. The desire of great families to secure their
wealth and shelter assets from future spouses, however, did not.
b. Mapping the Rise of the Spendthrift Trust
Spendthrift trusts,95 which protect assets from creditor claims, date back in
the United States to the end of the nineteenth century, when the U.S. Supreme
Court put its imprimatur on the form in Nichols v. Eaton.96 The case turned on a
widow’s will and her son’s bankruptcy. Mrs. Sarah Eaton established a testamentary
trust for her children with the proceeds from her estate, specifying that if the
bankruptcy of one of her sons would render the income “payable to some other
person, then the trust . . . should immediately cease.”97
91. For discussion and an overview of the separate estate, see id.
92. Id.
93. Amy Erickson remarks, “a second-time bride was older, perhaps wealthier, and wiser at least
in the ways of legal coverture than she had been the first time around.” ERICKSON, supra note 3, at 123.
94. RICHARD CHUSED, MARRIED WOMEN’S PROPERTY LAW: 1800-1850.
95. A spendthrift trust, in its most basic form, is a trust containing a provision stating that the
beneficiary cannot voluntarily alienate her interest in the trust. Because of this restriction, creditors
cannot attach the beneficiary’s interest nor can they obtain a court order to attach a future distribution.
This holds true even if the beneficiary is entitled to mandatory distributions and has funds available to
satisfy creditors. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
695–96 (Aspen Publishers, 9th ed. 2013). This is as opposed to pure discretionary trusts. With those
trusts, a creditor can obtain a court order to attached future distributions. Spendthrift trusts are against
public policy in England.
96. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 717–22, 723 (1875); see Adam Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and
Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 (1995). The spendthrift trust
had a longer history in England. The spendthrift trust was, at the time of Nichols, not tolerated under
English law.
97. Nichols, 91 U.S. 716 at 723.
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Not long after the mother died, one son declared bankruptcy and “made a
general assignment of all his property to Charles A. Nichols for the benefit of his
creditors.”98 Leaning on the doctrine of freedom of disposition, the Court sided
with the mother over the creditors, stating:
Why a parent . . . [who] wishes to use his own property in securing the
object of his affection . . . from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune,
and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should
not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.99
The decision was immediately criticized. John Chipman Grey, a vociferous
critic, boldly stated: “[S]pendthrift trusts have no place in the system of the
Common Law.”100 Nevertheless, the spendthrift trust was further grafted into
American law seven years later with Broadway National Bank v. Adams,101 in which
the Massachusetts state supreme court affirmed the right of a donor to dispose of
his property as he saw fit over the rights of creditors.102
Subsequently, the spendthrift trust became a useful tool that helped families
shelter assets from creditors, including spouses.103 Only fourteen years after
Broadway Bank, a Texas appellate court upheld the use of a spendthrift trust to keep
assets held in trust for the benefit of the husband from being counted as community
property.104 In McClelland v. McClelland, Dora McClelland sued her ex-husband
seeking rental income from property that had been left to her ex-husband by his
father. The court concluded that if “the income arising from the estate was not
available” to the husband, then it was not available to wife as community property
upon divorce. To allow the wife an interest in the trust income, the court reasoned,
would be to diminish and harm “the right of the testator.”105
Now, spendthrift provisions are standard boilerplate language in trust forms,
and drafters routinely include them in all kinds of trusts.106 Ordinary creditors can

98. Id. at 727.
99. Id. (holding that the mother had a legal right to establish for the benefit of her son a
testamentary trust that terminated the son’s right to assets if and when he became insolvent). The
holding did not, therefore, establish the validity of spendthrift trusts. The dicta did. Anne S. Emanuel,
Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179, 188 (1993).
100. See GARY, supra note 14, passim, summarized at 213.
101. Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 170 (1882).
102. Id. at 173 (“The founder of this trust was the absolute owner of his property. He had the
entire right to dispose of it, either by an absolute gift to his brother, or by a gift with such restrictions
or limitations, not repugnant to law, as he saw fit to impose.”).
103. Bradley v. Palmer, 61 N.E. 856, 881–82 (1901) (explaining that the mother created a
spendthrift trust for her son, who was an extravagant spender and an alcoholic, and stated specifically
that “in no case shall any of such income be applied to the support or maintenance of my said son’s
wife; and the same shall never be amenable to any order or judgment of a court which his said wife
might obtain for alimony, support, or for any other cause.”).
104. McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350, 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), writ refused.
105. Id.
106. Spendthrift trusts have become so ubiquitous that in Delaware, for example, all trusts are
presumptively spendthrift, and in New York all trusts are presumptively spendthrift with respect to
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only recover what they are owed once a distribution has been made. The Uniform
Trust Code (UTC) has, however, attempted to balance the equities at divorce by
deeming ex-spouses with divorce decrees to be “exception creditors,” who may
obtain an order attaching either present or future distributions from the trust,
although they may not compel a distribution.107
Spendthrift trusts created by third parties can keep family wealth out of the
hands of a spouse with the insertion of just one small provision barring the
beneficiary’s alienation of his trust interest. In a UTC state,108 however, an
ex-spouse may have some recourse, if she has a support order. The UTC,
accordingly, has strengthened marital partnership, giving it increased substance
when weighed against family wealth preservation.
c. “Mere Expectancies”: Hiding Assets in Plain Sight
To compound protection against creditors, settlors create trusts that contain
not only spendthrift provisions but also significant amounts of trustee discretion.
Because income from these trusts is not guaranteed to the beneficiary and is
distributable only at the trustee’s discretion, the money in trust is not available to
creditors unless and until the beneficiary actually receives a distribution. The validity
of these trusts, like the spendthrift trusts, was affirmed by American courts around
the turn of the nineteenth century on the basis of donor freedom. In the famous
Hamilton v. Drogo case, a New York court protected money put in trust for William
Drogo, Duke of Manchester, by his mother from creditors, concluding: “In the
present case no income may ever become due to the judgment debtor. We may not
interfere with the discretion which the testatrix has vested in the trustee any more
than her son may do so.”109 The creditors were out of luck until a distribution was
made to Drogo.
Discretionary trusts still play a large role in family wealth preservation and are
especially useful at divorce.110 Modern courts generally consider beneficiaries of a
discretionary spendthrift trust to possess nothing more than a speculative interest
in the trust assets—a “mere expectancy”—because they do not have a guaranteed
right to distributions from the trust. Five states—New Jersey, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin—include trust interests in the marital estate at
divorce only if the beneficiary has a present possessory interest or the right to

income. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 95, at 696. Only three states bar the enforcement of
these kinds of provisions.
107. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503. Distributions subject to attachment include distributions
required by the express terms of the trust, such as mandatory payments of income, and distributions
the trustee has otherwise decided to make, such as through the exercise of discretion.
108. There are currently thirty-three UTC states.
109. Hamilton v. Drogo, 150 N.E. 496, 497 (1926).
110. See Jonathan W. Wolfe, How a Trust May Impact Your Divorce Case, 38 FAM. ADVOC. 14,
15 (Fall 2015) (noting that while some states have “a breadth of precedent” governing this issue, other
states have few, if any, reported decisions).
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withdraw trust assets.111 Massachusetts courts generally maintain that any interest in
a discretionary trust is non-includable in the marital estate: “[A] party’s beneficial
interest in a discretionary trust . . . because of the peculiar nature of such a
trust . . . is too remote or speculative to be so included.”112 The Colorado Supreme
Court, elaborating on this rule, concluded in In re Marriage of Jones that, “unlike a
vested retirement plan, the beneficiary of a discretionary trust has no contractual or
enforceable right to income or principal from the trust, and cannot force any action
by the trustee unless the trustee performs dishonestly or does not act at all.”113
Divorcing spouses looking to pierce a trust and make the income available for
spousal or child support payments have somewhat better success in states that have
enacted the UTC. Here again, ex-spouses with divorce judgments are exception
creditors. With discretionary trusts, the UTC states that a court may order a
distribution to satisfy a court order for either spousal or child support, but only to
“[t]he extent a trustee has not complied with a standard of distribution or has abused
a discretion.”114 The potential for a court order to reach into a discretionary trust is
limited, however, as a court cannot direct a trustee to distribute more than the
standard set by the trust terms would have necessitated.
Discretionary and spendthrift trusts can, consequently, enable a high degree
of family wealth preservation based on the rights of the third-party donor. UTC
rules that make ex-spouses exception creditors recalibrate the balance of power,
but—as the case study in the next section demonstrates—third-party assets and a
lack of ownership equivalence remain deciding factors.
d. “Family Wagons Circled the Family Money”
The Massachusetts case of Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl was a recent and highly
contested example of how discretionary trusts work. The couple married in 2000
and during the marriage, the husband worked as an assistant bookstore manager at
one of his father’s subsidiary corporations, earning approximately $170,000
annually.115 In 2004, the husband also began receiving distributions from a trust that
his father established for his benefit.116 In the same year, the wife, who had been in
the Army Reserves, retired from that job at the behest of her husband, who wanted

111. Id. New Jersey courts, for example, have continuously held that a beneficiary spouse’s trust
interest does not constitute marital property unless the beneficiary has acquired “unimpaired control
and totally free use and enjoyment” of the trust assets. See Mey v. Mey, 79 N.J. 121, 125 (1979); see also
Paulson v. Paulson, 783 N.W.2d 262, 271 (N.D. 2010); Friebel v. Friebel, 510 N.W.2d 767, 769
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
112. See D.L. v. G.L, 811 N.E.2d 1013 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
113. In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152, 1156–57 (Colo. 1991) (concluding “[t]o the extent
that it has already not done so, the trial court on remand should consider the wife’s interest in the trust
as an economic circumstance” and a discretionary factor when allocating property and awarding
support).
114. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504.
115. Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. 105, 106 (2016).
116. Id.

First to Printer_Tait (Do Not Delete)

224

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/29/2019 1:36 PM

[Vol. 10:199

her to stay at home with their special needs daughter. The wife began working as an
ultrasound technician on a part-time basis and, at the time of the divorce, was
earning approximately $22,672 annually.117
At issue in the couple’s divorce proceedings was whether the present value of
the husband’s interest in the trust—an irrevocable discretionary spendthrift trust—
could be considered part of the marital estate.118 The trust benefitted an open class,
comprised of the father’s “living issue” and provided for distributions to
beneficiaries at the discretion of the trustees, “to provide for the comfortable
support, health, maintenance, welfare and education of each or all members of such
class.”119 At the time of the divorce trial, there were eleven living issue who were
beneficiaries and the trust had a value of approximately $25 million.120
The trial court judge valued the husband’s interest in the trust to be
one-eleventh of the trust value, or approximately $2 million. On appeal, the court
affirmed this inclusion of the husband’s trust interest in the marital estate and its
valuation.121 The court noted that the husband’s monthly distributions from the
trust, which had arrived regularly since the trust’s creation, stopped “precisely on
the eve of the husband’s divorce filing.”122 The other beneficiaries, in contrast,
continued to receive their distributions. The court stated: “[T]he spendthrift
provision is being invoked as a subterfuge to mask the husband’s income stream
and thwart the division of the marital estate in the divorce.”123 The court also noted
that one of the trustees was the husband’s brother, the other the family
attorney: “To use understatement: the record shows the 2004 trust was not
administrated impartially by the two trustees.”124 What had happened, the court
concluded, was that “as the divorce began, ‘the proverbial family wagons circled the
family money.’”125
The Massachusetts supreme court, however, disagreed with the lower court
rulings. Returning to the conventional analytic framework, the court concluded that
the husband’s trust interest was “so speculative as to constitute nothing more than
[an] expectanc[y],” and consequently it was not includable in the marital estate.126
The court remarked:
Interests in discretionary trusts generally are . . . too remote for inclusion
in a marital estate, because the interest is not “present [and] enforceable”;

117. Id. She earned another $7,428 in rental income.
118. Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 55 N.E.3d 933 (Mass. 2016).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2.
121. Id.
122. Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 37 N.E.3d 15, 17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015), review granted, 47
N.E.3d 684 (Mass. 2015), and vacated and remanded, 55 N.E.3d 933, 934 (Mass. 2016).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 21.
125. Id.
126. Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 55 N.E.3d 933, 934 (Mass. 2016). (quoting
Adams v. Adams, 945 N.E.2d 844, 859 (Mass. 2011).
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the beneficiary must rely on the trustee’s exercise of discretion, does not
have a present right to use the trust principal, and cannot compel
distributions.127
Commentators have vigorously debated the outcome of the Pfannenstiehl case.
Trust lawyers have supported the outcome, pleased that the court did not undo the
trust’s asset protection features.128 The husband’s lawyer stated his satisfaction with
the ruling based on donor intent: “[The husband’s father] did not intend . . . for an
ex-spouse to get part of his estate, and that’s what the court is upholding.”129
Another commentator wrote: “This is a relief to those who draft trusts for the
purpose of ‘asset protection.’”130 On the other hand, commentators have also
noted: “The equities of this case appear to favor Diane.”131 In addition, questions
about the independence of the trustee, the decanting of the trust, and the ability of
the court to encompass separate property into the marital estate using
Massachusetts’s hotchpot approach have continued to cast doubt on the result.
Pfannenstiehl demonstrates that discretionary spendthrift trusts continue to be
an effective mechanism for keeping assets out of the marital estate. The
effectiveness of this trust form in protecting assets, however, is clearly based on the
donor intent of the third party coupled with the beneficiary’s lack of ownership
interest. This is marriage law’s current resting point in creating balance between
marital partnership and family wealth preservation.
B. Something New: Asset Protect, Version 2.0
In the last several decades, prodigious changes to trust law in a number of
states have created new opportunities for family wealth preservation and asset
protection that go far beyond what already exists. In this Section, I analyze how
these new trusts break the old rules, enabling spouses to assert unilateral control
over possible marital assets, thereby disrupting the tenuous settlement between trust
wealth preservation and economic partnership.

127.
128.

Id. at 940.
See, e.g., Robert J. O’Regan, Pfannenstiehl: Out of a Mistake Comes Clarity,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (AUG. 9, 2016), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/
estate-planning/pfannenstiehl-out-mistake-comes-clarity [ perma.cc/QDY8-D7L4 ].
129. Michael Levenson, SJC Rules Heir Can Refuse to Pay $1.4m to Ex-wife, BOSTON GLOBE
(Aug. 05, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/08/05/high-court-rules-scion-wealthyfamily-doesn-have-pay-wife/cLDKzM7oTGbkvvVNM5O3dK/story.html [ perma.cc/FJ7K-VDGF ].
130. Matthew Solomon, Words Matter: Pfannenstiehl Overruled by Supreme Judicial Court,
ISRAEL, VAN KOOY & DAYS, LLC, http://www.yourfamilymatterslawblog.com/words-matterpfannenstiehl-overruled-by-supreme-judicial-court/ [ perma.cc/DYQ7-PH7P ] ( last visited July 15,
2017 ).
131. Harry S. Margolis, Does Pfannenstiehl Case Undermine Asset Protection in Massachusetts?,
MARGOLIS & BLOOM, LLP, (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.margolis.com/our-blog/does-recentdivorce-undermine-centuries-of-spendthrift-trust-law [ perma.cc/6HYP-LWRD ].
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1. QTIP Trusts: Bringing Back the Life Estate
While trusts have long been used to limit a surviving spouse’s property claims,
now there is a newer and increasingly popular mechanism for limiting a surviving
spouse’s interest in the decedent’s estate: the Qualified Terminable Interest
Property (QTIP) trust. QTIP trusts allow one spouse to unilaterally elect to put
assets—even potential marital assets—into a trust that simultaneously restricts the
surviving spouse to a life estate and qualifies for the unlimited marital deduction.
In this Section, I discuss the origin of the QTIP trust, how these trusts work to strip
a surviving spouse of both financial agency and marital property rights, and how
QTIPs are marketed to a masculinist sense of wealth preservation.
a. QTIPs and the Divorce Revolution
In 1981, when the U.S. Congress enacted the Economic Recovery Tax Act
(ERTA), the guiding theory for a number of changes was the “decision to use the
marital unit as the proper unit of taxation.”132 One of the major features of the Act
was the introduction of the unlimited marital deduction.133 No longer would there
be a limit on how much spouses could transfer to one another free of any transfer
tax at death. ERTA also authorized QTIPs as part of this “marital unit” scheme.134
Previous to the authorization of QTIPs, to qualify for the marital deduction
one spouse had to give the other spouse full control of the property. Life estates
and other terminable interests did not qualify for the deduction. QTIPs offered an
exception to this rule, allowing the decedent spouse to limit the surviving spouse’s
interest in the property to a life estate while still qualifying the property for the
marital deduction. Moreover, the rules of election adopted at the time allow one
spouse to place assets in a QTIP unilaterally, without the consent or knowledge of
the other spouse. Based on this combination of restricted ownership and unilateral
decision-making, Wendy Gerzog has remarked that “it was a rather Herculean leap
in logic that led Congress to state that the QTIP provisions reflect the shared
decision-making of a husband and wife in a marriage.”135
Looking past the “marital unit” language, Congress enacted QTIPs against a
social backdrop of increasing divorce, remarriage, and general marital instability.
Between 1970, when no-fault divorce first appeared on the legal landscape, and
1981, when ERTA was enacted, divorce rates had skyrocketed and no-fault divorce
was changing both cultural norms with respect to marriage as well as longstanding

132. Gerzog, supra note 57, at 306.
133. I.R.C. § 2056(a).
134. The Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d)(1),
95 Stat. 172, 302-03 (1981); I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(i), 2523(0(2); see also Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(b),
25.2523(0-1(b).
135. He wants his cake (i.e., the tax benefit of deferral), and he wants to eat it, too (i.e., to
control who will finally receive the underlying property).” Gerzog, supra note 57, at 319; see also
O’BRIEN, supra note 81, at 630.
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patterns of wealth transfer.136 Second and third marriages were becoming common
occurrences and the QTIP allowed spouses—usually husbands—to provide a life
estate interest to a second or third spouse, eliminating concern about what that
surviving spouse would do with the bulk of the money. The QTIP provided a
mechanism for ensuring that stepparents would not disinherit children from first
marriages and that the decedent spouse could provide for multiple sets of
dependents without interference. As one senator explained during the
Congressional debates: “The property owner would like to be sure that upon the
death of his spouse his children by a prior marriage or marriages share in his
property, including the marital deduction property.”137
The QTIP was the necessary result of the divorce revolution—a tool for
managing multiple marriages and the complications of estate planning that ensued
from these blended families. In addition, the QTIP has become a useful tool for
family wealth preservation by allowing asset preservation and playing into outdated
stereotypes about women, widows, and wealth.
b. Disinheriting Spouses Unilaterally
One of the greatest problems with QTIP trusts, from a marital partnership
perspective, is the fact that they allow one spouse to unilaterally elect QTIP
treatment of assets. If one spouse decides to set up the QTIP as an inter vivos
transfer, he can make the gift to the trust unilaterally; alternately, he can empower
his executor (assuming it is someone other than his surviving spouse) to make the
election at his death. The surviving spouse may have no input whatsoever and
certainly none is required.138
Surviving spouses are left, in such cases, with little remedy other than to
contest the QTIP election, an uphill battle, or take the elective share instead.139 The
latter option can be as difficult as the former, as In re Estate of Karnen, a case from
the Supreme Court of South Dakota in 2000, demonstrates. In that case, despite a
longstanding marriage, because the wife unilaterally created a QTIP, the husband
had only a life income in their marital estate and no assets to leave his heirs at his
death.

136. See Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1255–60 (2015).
137. Gerzog, supra note 57, at 310.
138. See Gerzog, supra note 57. One law firm suggests that the QTIP creator may want to
“prepare” the spouse. “Your spouse, for example, should know that income will flow life-long, but
access to the trust principal will be limited.” QTIP Trusts Still Offer Advantages, HOGAN TAYLOR,
http://hogantaylor.com/qtip-trusts-still-offer-advantages/ [ perma.cc/WX82-USHM ] ( last visited
July 16, 2017 ). Spouses may want to pick a good moment because “The surviving spouse typically
resents the restrictions against unlimited access to principal.” Q TI P s M a d e E a s y , IVKD LAW, http:/
/ivkdlaw.com/the-firm/our-articles/divorce-and-estate-planning/qtips-made-easy/ [perma.cc/
N6WP-HF5X ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ).
139. See Donna Litman, The Interrelationship Between the Elective Share and the Marital
Deduction, 40 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 539–65 (Fall 2005).
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The couple married in 1947 and had no children, living happily together for
fifty years until the wife’s death in 1997.140 The bulk of their assets were titled in the
wife’s name and, toward the end of her life when the wife executed a will, she
bequeathed all these assets to her husband. She gave him the ranch she had owned
at the time of marriage, which had been their marital home, as well as an estate
valued at over $2 million.141 Not long after, the wife’s health began to fail and
Norwest Bank was appointed conservator of her estate. For tax planning purposes,
the Bank revised her estate plan and threw out the first will. Subsequently, the Bank
created one trust in the amount of her estate tax exemption and placed the residue
of the estate in a QTIP.142 The husband was named the sole income and principal
beneficiary of both trusts. After his death, the remainder of both trusts was to go
to the wife’s heirs.143
Despite being able to access both income and principal in the trusts, the
husband elected to take his statutory share after his wife’s death. The court observed
that the husband wished “to attain a fee interest in a portion of the estate assets,
rather than merely the life interest . . . [in order] to pass something on to his
heirs.”144 The court was sympathetic to this desire, remarking: “[W]e understand
how Andrew might feel that he is entitled to fee ownership in a share of the estate
after fifty years of marriage.”145 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the husband
was not entitled to take his elective share because it was “overfunded,” that is to say
the amount made available to him via the will was more than he would receive under
the elective share.146 Accordingly, the trial court denied the husband’s petition to
take his elective share. Adding insult to injury, the South Dakota Supreme Court
remarked that the husband’s claim failed because “[t]he goal of our elective share
statutes is to protect a surviving spouse from disinheritance, rather than reward him
or her for contributions made to the economic partnership of an enduring
marriage.”147
QTIP trusts make the old new again. They revitalize estate planning that limits
the property rights of the surviving spouse in order to better provision other family
members. Furthermore, because of unilateral decision-making and the possibility of
fraud on marital property, QTIPs completely fail to account for marital partnership.
As a result, QTIPs dislocate the balance between family wealth preservation and
economic partnership.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

In re Estate of Karnen, 607 N.W.2d 32, 34 (S.D. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. This despite being adopters of the UPC.
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c. Marketing the QTIP to Men
As enacted, the QTIP provisions were “couched in politically correct, gender
neutral terms” and statistics, as well as caselaw, show that women as well as men
are consumers of the financial product.148 Nevertheless, women have for various
reasons been QTIP consumers at a lower rate than men since the authorization of
these trusts.149 Men’s wealth holdings are greater than women’s, making wealth
transfer planning a larger concern. Moreover, in different-sex marriages, life
expectancies suggest that men will be in the position of “first-to-die” and therefore
are forced to think about how a surviving spouse will manage assets left. Even if
the woman happens to be the wealth holder, however, Lily Khang observes that a
woman may be “less likely than her male counterpart to marry a series of younger
spouses and therefore . . . less likely to use a QTIP trust.”150 Khang also predicts
that women in same-sex marriages would be less attracted by the QTIP and are
“even less likely than heterosexual women to use QTIP trusts for a ‘Donald Trump
arrangement.’”151 Consequently, and responsive to this data, QTIP marketing
speaks directly to men and revives timeworn notions about women, their financial
literacy and spending habits.
Decidedly gendered, QTIP advertisements generally cast the husband as the
decedent and the wife as the surviving spouse—the problematic actor to be reined
in through QTIP rules.152 QTIP marketing materials stress three points in
promoting the trust form. First, that the surviving spouse may be an evil stepmother,
who will not provide for her stepchildren if given full control of her inheritance.
Second, that the surviving spouse may be financially unsophisticated and not good
with money; and third, that the money is your money, so you should be able to do
what you want with it, preserving it for future generations. Like the QTIP itself,
these gender stereotypes undermine the idea of spouses as equal partners in
marriage and promote consideration of the widow as a drain on family wealth.
Furthermore, QTIP marketing directly undermines the concept of marital property
and shared wealth.
True to the concerns that originally motivated the authorization of the QTIP,
law firms and estate planners today continue to advertise the QTIP as a vehicle for
protecting a spouse’s money in the age of blended families. Advertisements focus
on the fear that a surviving spouse will disinherit her stepchildren, given the
opportunity. One estate planner provides a vivid example of why someone, a
148. Gerzog, supra note 57, at 305
149. Khang, supra note 58, at 352 (“For 1995 decedents for whom estate tax returns were filed,
20% of male decedents used QTIP trusts while 8% of female decedents used QTIP trusts. In the same
year, male decedents used QTIP trusts for assets valued at $13.3 billion while female decedents used
QTIPs for assets valued at $3.2 billion.” Other studies show that the gap might be decreasing and
women might be catching up to men in their consumption of QTIPs.).
150. Id. at 352–53.
151. Id.
152. See Allison Tait, Commentary on U.S. v. Windsor, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN
TAX OPINIONS (Cambridge Press 2017); Khang, supra note 58, at 352;.
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husband might want to create a QTIP: “[With a QTIP], Jennifer has no power to
change the beneficiaries named in the QTIP. Mr. Q can rest peacefully, knowing
that his children from his first marriage will receive the assets remaining in the trust
after the death of Jennifer.”153 The Wilmington Trust estate planning advisors
phrase it similarly, if more elegantly: “The restrictive ownership provisions of a
QTIP trust are particularly useful for second marriages since you may want to
ensure that the amounts held in the trust will ultimately pass to your children or
family and not the children or family of your second spouse.”154 In this way, they
point out, a QTIP trust will “provide for your spouse after your death while
protecting your assets for future generations.”155 Another estate planner likewise
states that a QTIP allows the decedent spouse to say to widow as well as children:
“I took care of you both.”156 Taking a page from the dower handbook, these
characterizations of the QTIP focus clearly on a wealth transfer strategy of
supporting the widow with a life estate and enriching the heirs with the bulk of the
inheritance.
Another compelling reason to use a QTIP, according to advertisements, is to
quell the fear that the surviving spouse will over-consume the assets or otherwise
misuse them, due to her financial and investment incompetence.157 One law firm
advertises: “Control of the assets by a trustee will reduce the chance of depletion
through squandering or unwise investments by the surviving spouse.”158 Another
law firm, vividly setting forth the case for creating a QTIP using the Simpsons,
observes:
The one potential fly in the ointment that could prevent Homer’s children
from inheriting much, if any, assets in the Family Trust is that their
inheritance is dependent on Marge not spending it all and/or not making
bad investments that decrease the value of the assets held in the Family
Trust.159
There might also, estate lawyers suggest, be “bad actors” involved. In these
cases, the QTIP’s financial paternalism is a welcome safeguard: “The surviving
spouse might become vulnerable to bad financial advice or scammers, or be

153. How a Q-TIP Trust Protects Your Surviving Spouse, and Other Members of Your Family,
JOHN L. ROBERTS, http://estateplansplus.com/html/trusts_qtip.html [ perma.cc/P7AH-R6NP ] (last
visited July 16, 2017 ).
154. Wealth Planning: The Benefits of QTIP Trusts, WILMINGTON TR., http://
library.wilmingtontrust.com/wealth-planning/the-benefits-of-qtip-trusts [ perma.cc/LU7G-2GQA ]
( last visited July 16, 2017 ).
155. Id.
156. Charles Delafuente, A Guiding Hand for Bequests, Beyond the Grave, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/qtip-trust-guides-bequests-beyond-thegrave.html [ perma.cc/RK3M-78UZ].
157. Khang, supra note 58, at 353.
158. HOGAN TAYLOR, supra note 120.
159. What Is Qualified Terminable Interest Property Trust aka QTIP?, KEYT LAW, LLC, http:/
/www.keytlaw.com/arizonawills/2013/07/qtip/ [ perma.cc/M2VK-CMZ3 ] ( last visited July 16,
2017 ).
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subjected to influence by other family members who have their own interests in
mind. The QTIP trust insulates the spouse and the inheritance from these bad
actors.”160 Women, it is clear from this perspective, are not sufficiently proficient
with money and asset management to be given full ownership of property and
inheritance.
Compounding the problematic nature of these descriptions, QTIP
advertisements also indiscriminately characterize QTIP assets as belonging solely to
the decedent spouse—your estate, your money —and fail to acknowledge the concept
of shared assets, marital property, or economic partnership. Hence, one estate
lawyer was quoted in a story about QTIPs in the New York Times as saying that
QTIPs “could prevent a second wife from ‘running off with the assets’ of a deceased
husband.”161 The estate planner admits that this is, for better or worse, “a
stereotypical example.”162 However, estate planners routinely trade in these
stereotypes, declaring that QTIPs have the power to limit the agency of a “spouse
who may wish to leave your money to his or her children,”163 or a spouse who
remarries, letting the “the new spouse take[ ] marital ownership of your estate.”164
Without discussion of how the trust creator’s estate might actually be part of the
larger marital estate, QTIP advertisements and literature embody dated notions of
marital property ownership and play on the fears, as well as the entitlements, of
high-wealth spouses.
Ultimately, a typical advertisement blends all these concerns together and
offers up the QTIP as a total solution:
You could simply will your assets to your spouse and hope that he or she
will then pass them on to your heirs. But suppose the spouse has children
from another marriage: will they also get a piece or even most of your
estate? Or suppose your spouse is terrible with money and you wonder
whether your estate will survive long enough to make it to your
children . . . . The QTIP can be a perfect remedy for these concerns.165
The problem is that this marketing strategy—to say nothing of the legal
contours of the trust itself—is “rooted in the prejudices and stereotypes of the
1960s and can only be explained as . . . gender-biased [and] paternalistic.”166 Going
160. ROBERTS, supra note 153.
161. Delafuente, supra note 156.
162. Id.
163. Trust Basics, PRESSER L. FIRM, http://www.assetprotectionattorneys.com/Domestic_
Asset_Protection/Irrevocable_Trusts.aspx [ perma.cc/2KHK-Z7YY ] ( last visited Jan. 23, 2017 )
(emphasis in original).
164. Gary Plessl & Kevin Houser, Do You Need a Trust for Your Estate Plan?, NEXTAVENUE
(May 13, 2015), http://www.nextavenue.org/do-you-need-a-trust-for-your-estate-plan [ perma.cc/
6VUL-Z8KA ].
165. Id.
166. See GERZOG, supra note 57; Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the Qtip Trust and
the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729 (1997-1998) (“There is no doubt that the QTIP
device diminishes the autonomy of wives and widows, who statistically are the usual beneficiaries of
QTIP trusts. The wife or widow is deprived of any power to control the disposition of the property,
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even further, the QTIP and the way in which it is marketed signal a return to the
supremacy of family wealth preservation and the days of dower, when the husband’s
task was to “ensure that his widow [would] not squander the estate or disinherit the
decedent’s children.”167
2. Self-Settled DAPTs: Spouses Hiding Assets from Spouses
While QTIP trusts give one spouse the ability to limit the financial reach and
power of the other spouse at death, there are also new trust forms that allow one
spouse to shelter assets from the other at divorce. This Section provides a brief
description of how these trusts work and a history of how these trusts have been
authorized by state legislatures across the country. Subsequently, the Section offers
an analysis of not only how the trusts are beginning to show up on court dockets
but also how they are being sold as an alternative to prenuptial agreements.
a. Domesticating Asset Protection Trusts
Almost a century after the last gasps of the separate estate, self-settled asset
protection trusts are back. These trusts allow the settlor to be a beneficiary (and
even a trustee, under certain circumstances). That is to say, one spouse can place
assets in trust and then not only receive distributions as the beneficiary of the trust,
but also serve as one of the trustees charged with exercising discretion over those
distributions. Furthermore, the assets in trust will be protected from creditors,
including spouses. This development is surprising, to say the least, because—apart
from the separate estate, which rested on unique policy grounds168—self-settled
trusts have never been asset protection trusts.
The traditional rule for asset protection has been that, in order for a
beneficiary’s interest to be protected, the trust needed to be created by a third party.
The policy reason has always been thus:
To hold otherwise would be to give unexampled opportunity to
unscrupulous persons to shelter their property before engaging in
speculative business enterprises, to mislead creditors into thinking that the
settlor still owned the property since he appeared to be receiving its
income, and thereby work a gross fraud on creditors who might place
reliance on the former prosperity and financial stability of the debtor.169
This traditional rule is codified in the Uniform Trust Code, which states that
an individual cannot shield assets from creditors, including spouses, by placing them

and the property is usually in trust, which deprives her of administrative control. QTIP trusts implement
the husband’s dead-hand control.”).
167. Khang, supra note 58, at 353.
168. The separate estate looks different from a public policy point of view because it was a
necessary way of giving married women property rights at a time when they had none.
169. G.T. Bogert, TRUSTS § 40, at 155–56 (6th ed. 1987); see also Henery J. Lischer, Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. J. 479 (2000).

First to Printer_Tait (Do Not Delete)

2019]

10/29/2019 1:36 PM

TRUSTING MARRIAGE

233

in a trust for her own benefit.170 Accordingly, “even if the trust is discretionary,
spendthrift, or both, the settlor’s creditors can reach the maximum amount that the
trustee could under any circumstances pay to the settlor or apply for the
settlor’s benefit.”171
This longstanding rule began to crumble in the 1980s when the Cook Islands
amended governing law to allow for self-settled asset protection trusts in order to
attract foreign capital.172 The Cayman Islands, Belize, Nevis, the Channel Islands,
the Isle of Man, and other offshore jurisdictions followed suit, “and the great
Offshore Boom of the 1990s came like a tidal wave.”173 These trusts were known
as “Foreign Asset Protection Trusts” (FAPTs).174 Unhappy with the loss in trust
business that resulted, American states fought back. In 1997 Alaska enacted
legislation that allowed for the first Domestic Asset Protection Trusts (DAPTs).
Ninety days later, the Delaware legislature did the same, stating that the new rules
were “intended to maintain Delaware’s role as the most favored domestic
jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts.”175 Since that time, sixteen other states
have passed legislation authorizing DAPTs.176 These states compete with one
another and with offshore trust companies for business, and are ranked annually by
various law practices and legal commentators according to the strength of the asset
protection that they offer.177
In these rankings, one particularly important factor is how much protection
state DAPT laws provide against creditor spouses, and states offer various

170. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 (2000).
171. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 81, at 703. The reporter for the Restatement on
Trusts wrote, “it is well settled that where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision
restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditor can reach his
interest.” See Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The “Estate Planning Tool of the
Decade” or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 167 (2013).
172. Sterk, supra note 17, at 16. To that end, the statute included a number of measures that
made the Cook Islands a favorite trust situs for settlors seeking to avoid creditor claims.
173.
Jay Adkisson, A Short History of Asset Protection Trust Law, FORBES, (Jan. 26, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2015/01/26/a-short-history-of-asset-protection-trustlaw/#605ecd2f3fb4 [ https://perma.cc/LD83-ND5Z ].
174. See FOREIGN ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS, https://www.lodmell.com/asset-protection/
foreign-trusts [ perma.cc/5CVM-L9HZ ] ( last visited July 23, 2017 ).
175. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 81, at 705. Alaska and Delaware have not been shy
in expressing their respective desire to become the leading trust jurisdiction-not only domestically but
also as an alternative to the offshore jurisdictions which have garnered so much world-wide business in
the last several years. John K. Eason, Home from the Islands: Domestic Asset Protection Trust Alternatives
Impact Traditional Estate and Gift Tax Planning Considerations, 52 FLA. L. REV. 41, 53 (2000).
176. Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming, and West Virginia have also enacted legislation
validating APTs. Following the 1986 creation of the GST exemption, states have similarly raced to
change or abolish the rule against perpetuities and compete for dynasty trust business. Roughly $100
billion in trust assets has migrated into states that have provided for dynasty trusts.
177. STATE RANKINGS CHARTS, https://www.oshins.com/state-rankings-charts [ perma.cc/
4HC3-CQP7 ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ); Ashlea Ebeling, Comparing Domestic Asset Protection
Trust States, F ORBES ( July 6, 2016 ), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/07/06/
comparing-domestic-asset-protection-trust-states/#7caed6a765fe [ perma.cc/4VXK-E7HY ].

First to Printer_Tait (Do Not Delete)

234

10/29/2019 1:36 PM

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:199

competitive opportunities to shield assets from marital property and spousal
support claims. Nevada, for example “has apparently chosen to be even more
competitive by providing for no statutory creditor exceptions [including spouses]
to the self-settled spendthrift trust features of its legislation.”178 Oklahoma laws,
likewise, bar spouses from access to trust assets at divorce, as does Wyoming.179
Wyoming DAPT law even shields trust assets from spousal and child support claims
when the settlor is thirty days or more in default.180 Other states give more weight
to spousal claims, but doing so lowers their ranking and may make their jurisdiction
less attractive for trust formation purposes.
DAPTs, then, are a financial instrument that specifically promise asset
protection to divorcing spouses—contrary to general concepts not only of marriage
law but also public policy. And, by enabling one spouse to actively shelter assets
from the other, DAPTs force economic partnership to give way to family wealth
preservation of a new and particularly objectionable sort.
b. Family Conflict/Conflict of Law
Whether or not these protections hold up in court is, of course, another
question and one that has yet to be thoroughly tested. Because of the state
competition for business, one of the first legal issues arising with DAPTs is choice
of law. Because states advertise their DAPTs as having unique forms of asset
protection, trust agreements generally contain provisions stating that the trust is
subject exclusively to the law of the state in which it was created.181 Spouses have,
however, been challenging these exclusive provisions during divorce proceedings,
in the hopes of eliminating some of the most aggressive asset protection provisions
and rendering the trust assets subject to inclusion in the marital estate.
Such was the case in Dahl v. Dahl. In that case, Charles and Kim Dahl were
married and lived in Utah for almost eighteen years before filing for divorce and
beginning proceedings that the district court called a “train wreck.”182 Charles was
a cardiologist and Kim had worked for a short time at the beginning of the marriage
before becoming a stay-at-home parent and the primary caretaker of two children.183
In 2002, four years before Charles filed for divorce, he created the Dahl Family
Irrevocable Trust in Nevada, naming himself as beneficiary, his brother C. Robert
Dahl as Investment Trustee, and the Nevada State Bank as a co-trustee. Nevada
was listed as place of domicile in the trust’s choice of law provision. Charles funded

178. See Edward D. Brown & Hudson Mead, Divorce and the Self-Settled Trust: Insights Into
How-and Where-Clients Might Protect Their Trust Assets From Financial Risk of a Future Divorce 2,
FEATURE: EST. PLAN. & TAX’N (Feb. 2014), http://www.barryengel.com/pdf/divorce-self-settledtrust.pdf [ perma.cc/7BLV-6YHD ].
179. STATE RANKINGS CHARTS, supra note 177.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 5, 345 P.3d 566, 575.
183. Id. at ¶ 3, 345 P.3d at 575.
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the trust with 97% of a Utah LLC, Marlette Enterprises—a real estate investment
company that he owned and that was valued at approximately $1 million. In the
following year, the couple jointly transferred deed to their primary residence to
the trust.
When the marriage failed and the couple began divorce proceedings, Kim
sought a share of assets in trust, claiming they were marital property. The Utah
district court held that Kim had no enforceable interest in trust assets not only
because of the choice-of-law provision but also because the trust was irrevocable.184
On appeal, however, the Utah Supreme Court disagreed. Kim’s interest in the
marital home was undeniably marital property, the court observed, and there was
an open question as to what, if any, percentage of the real estate company was
marital property.185 Charles admitted that at least some part of the trust assets were
marital property and, consequently, the court stated: “Thus, to the extent that the
Trust corpus contains marital property, Utah has a strong interest in ensuring that
such property is equitably divided in the parties’ divorce action.”186 The court
therefore denied enforcing the trust’s choice-of-law provision and applied Utah law
instead.
Applying Utah law, the court concluded that the trust assets were reachable
and subject in part to equitable distribution, primarily because the court determined
that the trust was revocable—not irrevocable as Charles claimed. The trust
agreement stated: “The Trust hereby established is irrevocable. Settlor reserves any
power whatsoever to alter or amend any of the terms or provisions hereof.”187 As
William Lapiana and others have pointed out: “[T]his provision may contain a
typographical error—if one substitutes ‘no’ for ‘any,’ the phrase not only reads as
more natural but makes sense as a provision in an irrevocable trust.”188 The court
never ruled, then, on whether or not the assets would have been reachable by Kim
had the trust been irrevocable, and a drafting error may have cost Charles dearly.
Another similar case, IMO Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, likewise involved a
family business and a marital property dispute, both entwined with a protracted legal
battle over the assets in trust.189 In the Kloiber case, the trust was a dynasty trust, a

184. Id. at ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 577.
185. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27, 345 P.3d at 579. In addition, Ms. Dahl claims to have conveyed to the Trust
her interest in Marlette Enterprises and other marital property with a value of at least $2 million.
186. Id. at ¶ 22, 345 P.3d at 578.
187. Id. at ¶ 30, 345 P.3d at 580.
188. William Lapiana, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust at Divorce (“The lesson from Dahl is
that the key to achieving asset protection through a Nevada asset protection trust is to ensure that
Nevada law will be applied to the trust.”).
189. For more on the divorce, see Jay Adkisson, Delaware Anti-Suit Injunction Nixed as to
Dynasty Trust in Kloiber, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2014/
08/18/delaware-anti-suit-injunction-nixed-as-to-dynasty-trust-in-kloiber/6/#6bb14c77328b
[ perma.cc/94WX-WC5J ].
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particular form of a DAPT.190 And, although the trust was created by a third party
(the father), several features of the case mirror first-party-settled DAPT cases, in
particular the deep involvement of the husband/beneficiary with the trust, his
control over the trust, and the transfer of his business—a quasi-marital asset—into
the trust during the marriage.
The trust in question was a Delaware Dynasty Trust, that Glenn Kloiber had
created in 2002 with PNC bank for the benefit of his son, Daniel Kloiber. As the
primary beneficiary, Daniel had the right to withdraw up to five percent of the net
fair market value of the trust estate annually.191 Daniel was also given special powers
of appointment192 and was named as a “special trustee,” with sole authority to direct
the trustee in regards to investment decisions, distributions, and trustee removal and
selection.193 The trust, therefore, offered maximum asset protection and tax benefit
while still giving Daniel significant control over the assets.
Glenn initially funded the trust at creation with the small sum of approximately
$15,000. Less than a year later, Daniel sold 99.45% of his shares in the company he
had founded and co-owned, Exstream Software, Inc., to the trust for “an unsecured
promissory note with a face amount of $6 million.”194 By 2008, the trust had sold
all of this stock for approximately $310 million.195 Consequently, although a third
party (the father), technically created the trust, it looked much more like a selfsettled DAPT because of the trustee powers and beneficiary rights that Daniel held
coupled with the fact that the majority of the trust assets were proceeds from the
sale of his company.196
When the couple separated in 2010 and Daniel filed for divorce, Beth argued
that the trust assets were marital property. The divorce was being litigated in
Kentucky, where the couple resided, and the Kentucky court presiding over the
divorce entered a Status Quo order, providing: “[N]either party shall sell, encumber,
gift, bequeath or in any manner transfer, convey or dissipate any property, cash,
190. Dynasty trusts are like traditional third-party created asset protection trusts, but they are
created in jurisdictions that offer enhanced asset protection and exemption from the rule against
perpetuities.
191. “In addition, the Trustee ‘shall pay to or apply for [Dan’s] benefit’ such amounts as ‘shall
be necessary or advisable from time to time for [Dan’s] health, education, support and maintenance.’
Id. § 1.1.3. The Trustee also may use funds from the trust estate to provide and maintain a personal
residence for Dan. Id. § 1.1.7.” In re Kloiber, 98 A.3d 924, 929 (Del. Ch. 2014).
192. That permitted him to appoint the principal of the trust estate to the “wife of the Grantor’s
son,” to his blood relations, or to a charitable organization. Id.
193. The Special Trustee possessed powers including the following: “Sole authority to direct
the Trustee with respect to investment of the trust estate, id. § 9.1; Sole authority to direct the Trustee
with respect to Special Holdings, id. § 9.2; Sole authority to direct the Trustee with respect to
discretionary distributions, id. § 9.3; and Sole authority to remove and replace the Trustee, id. § 9.4.”
Id. at 931–32.
194. Id. at 932.
195. Id.
196. Jocelyn Margolin Borowsky & Richard W. Nenno, Myths and Facts About Kloiber,
MARTINDALE.COM (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.martindale.com/family-law/article_Duane-MorrisLLP_2242706.htm [ perma.cc/8DD3-MLJV ].
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stocks or other assets currently in their possession or control of another person,
company, legal entity or family member.”197 After the court issued these orders,
Daniel resigned as Special Trustee—transferring the power to his son—and PNC
filed a petition seeking a declaration that the Delaware courts had exclusive
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the administration of the trust. Daniel and
PNC argued that the relevant Delaware rules provided that: “The Court of Chancery
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any action brought with respect to a qualified
disposition.”198 Daniel and PNC argued for “the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of this court
to the exclusion of all other courts in the world, including the Kentucky Family
Court.”199
Unpersuaded by PNC’s argument, the Delaware court concluded that the
statutory language about “exclusive jurisdiction” meant only that the Delaware
Court of Chancery possessed exclusive jurisdiction with respect to other Delaware
courts. The statute, the court remarked, “is allocating jurisdiction among the
Delaware courts. The state is not making a claim against the world that no court
outside of Delaware can exercise jurisdiction over that type of case.”200 In
conclusion, the court remarked: “This case differs from a situation where parties
have agreed voluntarily by contract to an exclusive forum. Beth did not execute the
Trust Agreement, nor is there any indication that she chose explicitly or implicitly
to become bound by its terms.”201
After much back and forth, the final divorce settlement severed some portion
(an undisclosed amount) of the assets in trust in order to form a new trust for Beth,
and the question of whether any portion of the trust assets were marital property
was thus avoided. This end result, while leaving open the legal question of marital
assets in trust, represented a blow for the husband as well as the trust company.202
In this respect, the result hints at the possibility that family wealth preservation will
not completely overtake marital partnership.203 The question, however, is still far
from settled. Moreover, the clear trend is for states to adopt these types of asset

197. In re Kloiber, 98 A.3d 924, 933 (Del. Ch. 2014). A subsequent order additionally prohibited
Daniel from “taking action to facilitate, request or procure any change in any of the liquid, cash or cash
equivalent investments within the [dynasty trust], or within the entities within the [dynasty trust].”
198. Id. at 938 (citing 12 Del. C. § 3572(a)) (emphasis added in opinion).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 939 (concluding not only that Delaware did not have exclusive jurisdiction, but also
that Delaware did not have primary jurisdiction).
201. Id. at 940 (citing Garretson v. Garretson, 306 A.2d 737, 740 (Del. 1973)).
202. Steven J. Oshins, Beware of Rights of Beneficiary’s Divorcing Spouse in Delaware, INFORMA
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/beware-rights-beneficiary-sdivorcing-spouse-delaware [ perma.cc/AAW9-HFUV ].
203. Courts have found against granting jurisdiction to the state of trust settlement in others
creditor contexts. Notably in In re Huber, a case about a real estate developer trying to shield his assets
through the use of a DAPT. At least one commentator has argued that these types of trusts should be
protected as a matter of supporting trustor intent. See Brendan Duffy, In States We “Trust”: Self-Settled
Trusts, Public Policy, and Interstate Federalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 205 (2016).
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protection trusts and the more states that adopt them, the less important the
jurisdictional question will be.
c. New and Improved Prenuptial Agreements
Despite these recent court challenges, the enhanced protections that
DAPTs offer against spousal claims in the event of divorce mean that estate and
financial planners are heavily marketing DAPTs as a new and improved alternative
to prenuptial agreements. In fact, trust-based premarital arrangements are quite
literally being marketed as direct competitors to contract-based prenuptial
agreements. The contract-based way of doing things, so the story goes, involved
awkward and prolonged drafting and there were many obstacles to successful
negotiation. According to one estate lawyer: “Prenuptial agreements are good, but
there are numerous personal and legal issues that deter couples from actually
executing a prenuptial agreement.”204 DAPTs, according to the same narrative,
present a better and more compelling opportunity to engage in significant family
wealth preservation because of the robust asset protection offered by the DAPT at
divorce and because one soon-to-be spouse can create a DAPT without the
knowledge of the other.
A major selling point for trust companies and estate planning firms in all of
the nineteen states that allow DAPTs is the exceptional asset protection they can
offer at divorce.205 Delaware trust companies advertise “extra breaks, including
stronger protection from creditors and potential exclusion of assets in divorce
proceedings.”206 Another law firm suggests the use of DAPTs, because “utilizing
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts in the pre-marital planning process greatly
reduces the chances of a successful attack resulting in the equitable distribution of
property brought to the marriage.”207 Some estate planners, in a more whimsical
vein, give names to their financial products. For example, the “Ultimate Cowboy
Cocktail” is a Wyoming LLC that is owned by a Wyoming Asset Protection Trust
and administered by a Wyoming Private Trust Company, and it is advertised as

204. Richard Shapiro et al., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts v. Prenuptial Agreements, BLUSTEIN,
SHAPIRO, RICH & BARONE, LLP (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.mid-hudsonlaw.com/blog/domesticasset-protection-trusts-v-prenuptial-agreements/ [ perma.cc/B89F-UK3J ]. Of course, “The safest bet,
say advisers, is to combine asset-protection structures with prenuptial agreements—what lawyers call
the ‘belts and suspenders’ approach.”
205. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
206. Dynasty Trusts Let U.S. Wealthy Duck Estate, Gift Taxes Forever, BLOOMBERG NEWS
( July 28, 2011), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/dynasty-trusts-let-us-wealthy-duck-estate-gift-taxesforever--7913.html [ perma.cc/VQR4-R5Q4 ]. In states that have not adopted the UTC, local rules do
not generally dictate any exceptions for spouse creditors.
207. Use of Asset Protection Trusts in the Pre-Marital Planning Process, MCKONLY & ASBURY,
http://www.macpas.com/use-of-asset-protection-trusts-in-the-pre-marital-planning-process/
[ perma.cc/S2JX-SWHB?type=image ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ).
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offering strong asset protection during divorce proceedings.208 Marketing for
Nevada trust companies is simple: “Nevada is one of two states that have no
exception creditors. This includes divorcing spouses.”209 Doubling down on this
focus on asset protection at divorce, trust companies and law firms also consistently
characterize spouses as overreaching and unduly entitled.
In addition to emphasizing heavy-duty asset protection, trust companies and
estate planners also market DAPTs by highlighting that—unlike prenuptial
agreements—they can be created by one fiancé without the knowledge of the other.
From this perspective, DAPTs are a good alternative to pre-marital contracts
because they help fiancés avoid “awkward” conversations about money and the
retention of separate property. A dynasty trust in Delaware, for example, serves “as
a substitute for prenuptial agreements, offering protection of the pre-marital estate
of an individual without negotiations over a prenuptial agreement.”210 One estate
lawyer explains the problem with prenuptial agreements: “The bottom line is
that while many couples are delighted to share their lives together when entering
into a marriage, they may feel uncomfortable sharing information about their
net worth.”211 A commentator writing in the American Bar Association newsletter
also describes the utility of the DAPT by underscoring the “low-stress” angle: “This
technique is very appealing to many individuals who, although [they] would like to
protect their assets from their future spouse . . . would like to do so quietly and
without any hassle.”212
Putting a more positive spin on the desire to avoid potentially uncomfortable
conversations about finances, estate planners and trust firms also promote the
DAPT as the “romantic” alternative. Prenuptial agreements, the advertisements
pronounce, kill the romance and joy of wedding planning. DAPTs, on the other
hand, keep the romance alive. The following is typical of the DAPT promotion
literature:
[O]ne individual can enact premarital asset protection planning without his
or her fiancé’s involvement. Due to the unromantic pitfalls of negotiating
a family property settlement the week of the wedding, some proactive

208. The Seven Tiers of Asset Protection Planning: http://appersondev.melloncg.net/
images/7_Tiers_of_Asset_Protection_Planning.pdf [ perma.cc/9LT9-C8RZ ] (#5 is the Cowboy
Cocktail and #6 is the Ultimate Cowboy Cocktail).
209. The 4 Things You Need to Know About a Nevada Asset Protection Trust, PREMIER TRUST,
https://premiertrust.com/2016/12/30/the-4-things-you-need-to-know-about-a-nevada-assetprotection-trust/ [ perma.cc/M68T-C9QZ ] ( last visited July 17, 2017 ).
210. Northern Trust, Delaware Trusts: Safeguarding Personal Assets (2019), https://
www.northerntrust.com/documents/white-papers/wealth-management/research/delaware-trustssafeguarding-personal-wealth.pdf?bc=25683840 [ perma.cc/5SJ5-XE3H ].
211. Shapiro, supra note 204.
212. Kalimah Z. White, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: An Alternative to Prenuptial
Agreements 2 (Feb. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news
_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/domestictrust.html [ perma.cc/W9B7-4657 ]. Of course, “The
safest bet, say advisers, is to combine asset-protection structures with prenuptial agreements—what
lawyers call the ‘belts and suspenders’ approach.”
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individuals are avoiding the prenup altogether. The domestic asset
protection trust is the single best alternative a single person can take to
protect his or her assets from divorce.213
A Dallas estate lawyer also focuses on the romance aspect, stating: “Many
wealthy individuals choose to forgo a prenup altogether, for fear that it will dim the
ardor of romance—and for them a premarital trust is a good alternative.”214 And
another trust lawyer echoes this sentiment: “As a practical matter, asking a future
spouse to enter into a prenuptial agreement often causes discomfort to blossoming
love relationships.”215
DAPT marketing, then, underscores the fact that these trusts are highly
suitable for marriage planning and that they offer benefits in terms of secrecy and
efficiency that contract-based forms of marriage settlement do not. This marketing
strongly stresses family wealth preservation over marital partnership and treats the
spouse or soon-to-be spouse as nothing more than a potential liability and drain on
family resources.
III. SAFEGUARDING MARITAL ECONOMIES
It is clear that QTIPs, DAPTs, and some dynasty trusts represent a new kind
of incursion against marital partnership. What remains is the question of how to
recalibrate the balance between family wealth preservation and marital partnership.
In this Part, after describing the insufficiency of current protections, I propose
several solutions to help rebuild the integrity of both the family wealth preservation
and marital partnership value-spheres by placing constraints on what one spouse
can do unilaterally in terms of trust creation and funding. In particular, I suggest
ways to better regulate the ability of one spouse to engage in asset preservation
through various forms of disclosure and consent requirements. The new marriage
trusts—the “have your cake and eat it too”216 type of trusts—should not be allowed
to operate as unrestrained vehicles for spousal disempowerment and marital fraud.
A. The Current Limits of Trust Creation: Fraudulent Transfers
As things currently stand, there are some constraints on and limits to what
one spouse can transfer into trust during marriage. The most common challenges
to these transfers that disinherit spouses and defraud the marital estate arise from
the fraudulent transfer doctrine, which “represents the dominant approach for
identifying and remedying sham transactions.”217 Fraudulent transfers may be
challenged pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (amended in 2014 to
213. Divorce Asset Protection, ASSET PROTECTION PLANNERS, http://assetprotection
planners.com/articles/divorce//[ perma.cc/GR2R-DVWF ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ).
214. Id.
215. Shapiro, supra note 201.
216. HYCET, supra note 12.
217. Alexander Boni-Saenz & Reid Kress Weisbord, Sham and Remedial Doctrines, 22 TR. &
TR. 850, 852 (2016).
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become the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act), which states that transfers will be
void if they were made with the intent to defraud or if “badges of fraud” are
present.218 The fraudulent transfer doctrine enables recovery for a spouse in the
case of extreme behavior and actual fraud. There are, however, problems that
remain. The following two sections explain the limits of the doctrine and what types
of cases still fall between the cracks, leaving a disinherited or impoverished spouse
with little recourse.
1. “Badges of Fraud” and the Surviving Spouse
One substantial problem with using the conventional fraudulent transfer
standard is the difficulty of proving intent to defraud. As a result, courts are
commonly faced with the problem of identifying indicia of fraud, or what most
courts call “badges of fraud.” And, in the context of estate planning, spouses are
generally allowed great latitude before something becomes a badge of fraud. For
example, courts do not think it is necessarily inappropriate that one spouse transfers
assets to someone other than his spouse in the course of estate planning, especially
if the recipient is a child or other relation.
Typical is the case of Karsenty v. Schoukroun, in which the surviving spouse
claimed that assets transferred from the decedent spouse to his daughter using a
revocable trust were fraudulently transferred.219 The proper question, the court
remarked, was whether the transaction was a “sham” and therefore invalid.220 As a
threshold matter, the court stated, “[A] surviving spouse must show that the
decedent retained an interest in or otherwise continued to enjoy the transferred
property.”221 If the decedent retained an interest, the court then would look to see
if the decedent had a sound estate planning reason for making the transfer in such
a way as to retain an interest. Factors in the analysis also included the degree to
which the transfer “deprives a surviving spouse of property that she or he would
otherwise take as part of the decedent’s estate,”222 and “the familial relationship
between the decedent and the person or persons who benefit by the challenged inter
vivos transfer.”223 The court noted in particular the legitimacy of transfers providing
for children from a previous marriage.224 Looking at the question from this
perspective, the court concluded that the transfer from the decedent to his daughter

218. Fifteen states have enacted the UVTA, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title
=Voidable%20Transactions%20Act%20Amendments%20(2014)%20 %20Formerly%20Fraudulent%
20Transfer%20Act [ perma.cc/Y87E-SLR9 ]. Only Rhode Island is a DAPT state. See Amy Amundsen,
Domestic Asset Protection Trusts in Divorce Litigation, 29 AAML 1, 25 (2016).
219. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1158 (Md. 2008).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1176.
223. Id. at 1179.
224. Id. (explaining that these types of transfers within blended families, the court said, were to
be viewed “differently than they would view a similar transaction in a single-family unit”).
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from a previous marriage was done in good faith and that “the court must respect
the estate planning arrangements of the decedent.”225
For a transfer to be fraudulent, the circumstances are usually quite extreme. In
an Arkansas case, In re Estate of Thompson, the court set aside a transfer after
concluding that it was made with the intent of disinheriting the surviving spouse.226
At the outset, the court noted that Arkansas law was “well settled” in that the
surviving spouse’s elective interest vested only in property that the deceased spouse
owned at the time of death.227 The court went on to remark, however, that because
“the surviving spouse’s right to an elective share is inviolate,” the court would set
aside any transfers found to be made with fraudulent intent.228 The trial court had
found fraudulent intent based on the fact that the husband had transferred more
than $6 million to a revocable trust just prior to his death in 2010, leaving his spouse
nothing more than a bequest of $100,000 that was contingent upon her not
contesting the will.229 The trial court also determined that, in previous iterations of
his estate plan, the husband had provided generously for his spouse and that it was
only in the final version of his will that he had redrafted the terms “in order to leave
her basically nothing.”230 Concluding that the decedent’s actions had been meant to
disinherit the surviving spouse in retribution for placing the decedent in a care
facility, the court allowed the trust assets to be included in the decedent’s probate
estate “for the limited purpose of calculating the elective share.”231
Transfers, then, are not fraudulent if there is a legitimate estate planning aim.
This is particularly true when blended families come into play and the surviving
spouse is perceived or assumed to have financial interests that differ from the
decedent’s children. Fraudulent transfer rules can, then, serve as a nominal
safeguard for a surviving spouse’s financial interests. They do not, however, fully
safeguard economic partnership at death.
2. Fraudulent Transfers at Divorce
The fraudulent transfer doctrine also protects spouses at divorce. Typical
statutes render void transfers made “with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud
creditors, purchasers, or other persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully

225. Id. at 1172.
226. In re Estate of Thompson, 434 S.W.3d 877, 881–82 (Ark. 2014).
227. Id. Arkansas law gives a surviving spouse the right to elect to take a share of the estate of
his or her deceased spouse against the will of the deceased. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28–39–401. This
elective share is the equivalent of the spouse’s dower or curtesy rights, as well as any homestead rights
and statutory allowances.
228. In re Estate of Thompson, 434 S.W.3d at 883.
229. Id. at 884–85.
230. Id. at 885.
231. Id. at 887, reh’g denied ( June 19, 2014) (explaining that the court also noted that “[t]he
intent to defeat the marital rights or the elective share will not invalidate any other lawful purpose of
the trust”).
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entitled to,”232 and this includes spouses as creditor. As with transfers made as part
of estate planning, however, it is difficult for one spouse to prove actual intent to
defraud. Therefore, courts maintain the focus on “badges of fraud” and, with
divorce, look in particular to timing.233
In a 2003 case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, for example, the court
was called upon to evaluate transfers that the husband made into an Offshore Asset
Protection Trust (OAPT) in the Bahamas. The court noted that “common badges
of fraud include . . . lack or inadequacy of consideration, close familial relationship
or friendship among the parties, retention of possession or benefit of the property
transferred, the financial condition of the transferor both before and after the
transfer, the chronology of events surrounding the transfer, the transfer takes place
during the pendency or threat of litigations, and hurried or secret transactions.”234
The husband had created a family trust in the Bahamas in November of 1995, when
the couple was having marital difficulties, and “transferred a substantial portion of
the marital assets to the trust.”235 One year later, the wife filed for divorce and in
April of 1997 the couple definitively separated. After the creation of the trust and
up until the divorce hearings, the husband continued to makes transfers into trust.
During the divorce proceedings, the wife challenged these transfers as fraudulent.
Considering the previous list of badges of fraud, the court agreed with the
wife. The court found particularly troubling the fact that the husband had created
the trust and retained significant control over the assets. The trust allowed the
husband to be named as a beneficiary, and the husband retained control over
distributions to the extent that income was taxable to him and “the family trust
assets would be included in his estate should he die.”236 The timing and creation of
the trust were also suspect, given that the husband created the trust “in secret”237
only after the marital troubles began and continued to transfers assets into it up
until the time of the property division hearing. Consequently, the court affirmed
the trial court ruling that the transfers were made with the intent to defraud the
wife.238
The biggest problem with the fraudulent transfer doctrine is that only the most
egregious types of transfers are penalized—after the fact—and one of the most
determinative factors tends to be timing. If the couple is separated and divorce
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (West 2019); see Buchanan v. Buchanan, 585 S.E.2d 533, 535
(Va. 2003).
233. “Circumstantial evidence of intent in these cases also often takes the form of certain badges
of fraud. We have defined badges of fraud as “a fact tending to throw suspicion upon the questioned
transaction, excites distrust as to bona fides, raises an inference that a conveyance is fraudulent and by
its presence usually requires a showing of good faith.” Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d 587, 592–
93 (Wyo. 2003).
234. Id. at 593.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 590.
237. Id. at 594.
238. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d at 593. For another example, see Buchanan v. Buchanan, 585 S.E.2d
533, 535 (Va. 2003).
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proceedings are in the works, courts are much more likely to conclude that a
questionable transfer is fraudulent. However, if one spouse makes a transfer during
an intact marriage, it likely will not be flagged and treated as a fraudulent. A better
alternative is required.
B. Rejecting Unilateral Decision-making
More useful than the focus on fraudulent transfers, and more apt in the
marriage context, is a regulatory framework premised on limiting the powers of one
spouse to act unilaterally at any point in preparation for or during marriage.
Economic partnership within marriage necessitates certain forms of joint decisionmaking, and financial and estate planning should ideally be collaborative terrain or,
at the very least, consultative. Economic partnership entails both spouses not only
knowing about wealth planning activities that impact the couple but also having a
voice with respect to the selection of various financial products. A set of rules
limiting unilateral action would help to re-establish the current boundary that
separates family wealth preservation from economic partnership, and support the
conventional demarcation of these two value-spheres. This section suggests several
ex ante methods for increasing and enhancing joint decision-making about marital
wealth.
1. QTIPs: Choosing Collaborative Decision-Making
Rejecting unilateral decision-making in the case of QTIPs is a modest fix: the
title-holding spouse or that spouse’s executor should not be able to put assets in
trust or make the QTIP election without the consent of the other spouse. Currently,
the donor spouse or the donor’s executor can choose to make the QTIP election
regardless of what the surviving spouse wants.239 If the QTIP is an inter vivos trust,
the donor spouse makes the election by filing a gift tax QTIP election form; if the
QTIP is created at the donor’s death, the executor makes the election when filing
the federal estate tax form. In either situation, the spouse has no official role in the
process and her consent is neither required nor even recommended. Wendy Gerzog
has previously proposed the seemingly simple solution that the surviving spouse be
the one to make the election. Gerzog states:
If the widow, rather than the donor or executor, held the QTIP election
power, she would have greater involvement in the QTIP process, and the
marital nature of the provisions would be stronger. In addition, this change

239. I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(v), 2523(0(4). In the context of estate tax marital deduction, the
executor must make the election on the last timely-filed return. In the case of the gift tax marital
deduction, the donor must make the election on the last timely-filed gift tax return. Once the election
is made, it is irrevocable. See Treas. Regs. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(b)(4), 20.2056(b)-7(c), 25.2523(f)-(b)(3); see
also Gerzog, supra note 57 (“However, there is no requirement that the donee spouse participate in any
way in this decision.”).
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would demonstrate more effectively that the QTIP provisions attempt to
protect the transfer of “their” property from current taxation.240
Making the surviving spouse the one to elect for QTIP treatment of a trust—
or requiring her consent in some form—would recognize marital partnership and
instantiate joint economic decision-making on the couple’s part. In addition, this
modification would recognize the fact that, in many cases, the trust assets are marital
property.
QTIPs could still serve their purpose by facilitating estate planning in blended
families and family wealth preservation could continue almost unabated—except
for the required procurement of spousal consent.
2. DAPTs: Constraining the Self in Self-Settled
The same principle of reforming rules that authorize unilateral action should
also be applied to DAPT creation and regulation within marriage. DAPTs that allow
one spouse to unilaterally create the trust and shelter assets directly contravene the
notion of economic partnership and represent an inappropriate intervention of
wealth preservation into the marital economy. Consequently, as states both enact
and modify DAPT rules and as courts begin to address their asset protection
capacities, values of collaborative decision-making and consent should be placed
front and center. Aligned with the notion of marital partnership, states should
require affirmative spousal consent for transfers into DAPTs and, in the absence
of affirmative spousal consent, these transfers should be subject to judicial scrutiny
at divorce in order to determine whether they consist of marital property.
To begin, one spouse should not be able to create or transfer assets into a
DAPT during marriage without notice and consent. Estate planners generally
recommend: “[A] DAPT should not be established when your client’s life is in
turmoil and this would include immediately prior or after a divorce action has been
initiated.”241 DAPTs, they suggest, should be funded “either well before entering
into the marriage or [in some states] during a stable marriage.”242 Cautions against
trust formation during or just previous to divorce are not sufficient, however, to
regulate unilateral trust creation and wealth decision-making within marriage.
Currently, South Dakota is the only DAPT state with a statutory requirement for
this type of notification. In South Dakota, marital property transferred into the
DAPT is protected at divorce, but only if the spouse received notice in the form
provided by the statute or provided written consent after having received

240. Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP Provisions, 35 REAL PROP. PROB &
TR. J. 97, 107 (2000); see also Gerzog, supra note 57, at 327; Wendy C. Gerzog, Illogical and Sexist QTIP
Provisions: I Just Can’t Say It Ain’t So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (1998).
241. A Legal Guide to Domestic Asset Protection Trusts and Divorce, LAWFIRMS, http://
www.lawfirms.com/resources/divorce/a-legal-guide-domestic-asset-protection-trusts-divorce
[ perma.cc/LZ3C-VXAF ] ( last visited July 16, 2017 ).
242. Brown & Mead, supra note 178.
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substantially similar notice.243 The statue directs that any letter of notice contain the
following language, in capital letters and at the top of the letter:
YOUR SPOUSE IS CREATING A PERMANENT TRUST INTO
WHICH PROPERTY IS BEING TRANSFERRED. YOUR RIGHTS
TO THIS PROPERTY MAY BE AFFECTED DURING YOUR
MARRIAGE, UPON DIVORCE (INCLUDING THE PAYMENT OF
CHILD SUPPORT OR ALIMONY OR A DIVISION OR
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE), OR AT THE
DEATH OF YOUR SPOUSE.244
The notice must also describe the property being transferred.245 The spouse
may request a copy of the trust document and is advised to seek independent legal
counsel.246 Failure to object after notice is construed as consent.247 Amending the
rule and requiring affirmative consent as the default would further improve fairness
between spouses and enhance partnership rules. Without written consent, no
transfers of marital property made unilaterally into a DAPT during marriage—not
just those made in anticipation of divorce—should receive asset protection.
These rules would not preclude spouses from using DAPTs or even from
creating them during marriage. It would only prevent secret transfers into trust with
marital property. With notice and consent, spouses should be free to manage their
assets as they see fit, and a recent DAPT case from Nevada demonstrates this
principle in action. The spouses in Klabacka v. Nelson married in 1983, signed a
separate property agreement (SPA) in 1993, transmuting their community assets
into separate property, and in 2001 funded two separate self-settled asset protection
trusts, each with the separate assets of one spouse.248 As the court
remarked: “Suffice it to say, the parties have substantial trust issues.”249
Nevertheless, both parties were aware of the transactions and not only did both
parties consult counsel prior but the wife also consulted additional outside counsel
prior to her signing.250
At divorce, the wife argued that the trusts were not validly created and that
the SPA did not hold at divorce. The court disagreed, referencing the ongoing
consent both parties had given and the knowledge both had about the management
of their wealth.251 This case highlights that partnership entails conversation, notice,
and consent—not necessarily asset sharing. Partnership encompasses the right of
243. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15(2)(b).
244. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55 16-15(3)(a); Codified Laws, S.D. LEGISLATURE, http://
www.sdlegislature.gov/Statutes/Codified_Laws/DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=55-16-1
5 [ perma.cc/MB3L-2WAH ]. No notice is required for separate property.
245. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15(3)(b).
246. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-15(3)(a).
247. Id.
248. Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 943 (Nev. 2017).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (concluding that if, through tracing, any community property was in either trust the
district court was to make an equal distribution of that community property).
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spouses to engage in private ordering and asks only that these private arrangements
be agreed upon mutually, after discussion and consultation.
3. Quasi-Marital Property: Minding One’s Own Business?
To add another layer of protection to marital property rights, one spouse
would not only be required to provide notice to the other when creating or
transferring marital assets into a DAPT but also when transferring separate
property. In some states—Alaska, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, and
Wyoming—a settlor looking to create a DAPT must provide a sworn affidavit
stating that he has full rights and title to the trust property and, therefore, unfettered
authority to create a trust with the assets.252 Furthermore, it is standard practice for
estate planners to ensure that a settlor holds full and clear title to the property being
transferred into trust. Nevertheless, these kinds of measures are not always
sufficient to protect against the transfer of quasi-marital property into a DAPT. As
such, specific additional measures are needed to protect spousal rights in property
that might technically be the separate property of one spouse during the marriage
but that might be quasi-marital at divorce because of the active contributions of the
non-owner spouse.253
This kind of problem arises most commonly with assets subject to an increase
in value because of spousal contributions. A family business or personal business
interest is the classic example and one that appears repeatedly in the caselaw. In
Dahl, for example, the husband funded the Nevada DAPT with his interest in the
real estate investment company that he owned.254 In Kloiber, the husband transferred
99.45% of the shares of Exstream Software, Inc., a document management
company that he founded with a friend, for an unsecured promissory note with a
face amount of $6 million.255 The trust then sold the shares for over $300 million
dollars. In both cases, the husbands had the ability to transfer shares because they
were technically separate property when the trust was funded. Nevertheless, in both
cases, there was a significant possibility that any increase in value to the company
was marital property.
This same problem arises both at death and divorce. In In re Estate of Littleton,
for example, husband and wife were married for thirty-six years at the time of the
husband’s death. Five years before he died, the husband transferred the bulk of his
assets, consisting mostly of rental property, into a trust. The trust terms provided
that the wife receive “personal items, home furnishings and the monthly cash sum
of $4,000.00 for her lifetime.”256 Unhappy with this outcome, the wife chose to
assert her elective share rights, alleging that her share was $1.2 million, a sum she
252. See Amundsen, supra note 218.
253. This problem is obviated by community property rules. I assume in this discussion that we
are talking about separate property states.
254. Dahl v. Dahl, 345 P.3d 566, 576 (Utah 2015).
255. In re Kloiber, 98 A.3d 924, 932 (Del. Ch. 2014)
256. In re Estate of Littleton, 313 P.3d 1062, 1064 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013).
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produced by including the value of one particular car lot she claimed was marital
property. The court, then, had to determine whether the car lot property was “joint
industry during coverture ( JIDC) property,”257 a form of marital property. Evidence
showed that the husband had acquired the car lot before marriage. However, the
court observed, the wife “may have acquired an interest in the enhanced value of
Decedent’s separate property through either Decedent’s or her efforts, skills or funds
during the marriage.”258 The court consequently remanded the case for further
proceedings to inquire into the wife’s contributions.
In these situations, an affidavit stating the husband had all rights to the
property would not have caught the quasi-marital nature of the property being
transferred. Notice of the transfer to the spouse would, on the other hand, help
ensure the knowledge as well as the consent of the non-owner spouse. Notice, then,
should be sent to the spouse when separate, not just marital, property is being
transferred into a DAPT. Notice would help increase transparency about the ways
in which assets are managed within marriage and could help prevent secret transfers
of special assets like business shares. To compound protections afforded by notice
requirements, these special assets—like family businesses—should be subject to
scrutiny at divorce to help ensure that marital property is not inappropriately
sheltered from a spouse who contributed to its value.
In order to better actualize economic partnership, spouses should be informed
about asset transfers of not just marital but also separate property, particularly
separate property that is subject to appreciation in value. In some cases, the property
will legitimately be separate property, but the harm of providing additional
information to a spouse is much less—and of a different order—than the harm of
secrecy.
4. Protecting the Margins
Finally, because economic partnerships do not necessarily begin at the actual
moment of marriage, there should be look-back periods to ensure that one spouse
did not transfer assets into trust the day before the wedding in a “romantic” attempt
to shelter wealth. This is particularly important because many couples begin to
commingle funds and engage in joint financial planning once they agree to marry
but prior to the actual marriage.
Other areas of law provide models for look-back periods, designed with a
similar intention—to uncover sham transfers made with the intent to defraud. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) includes in the decedent’s gross estate certain
transfers made within three years of the death for purposes of wealth transfer

257. Id. at 1065 (The court began its analysis stating: “When a court is asked to determine
whether property is separate or marital, the same rules apply whether the issue is raised in a divorce or
upon the death of a spouse”).
258. Id. at 1066.
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taxation.259 Medicaid has a five-year look-back period and individuals seeking
eligibility must disclose all financial transactions they were involved in during a
period of five years prior to application to determine whether the applicant
transferred any assets for less than fair market value.260 Finally, in bankruptcy law,
there is a two-year look-back period meant to reveal fraudulent transfers, in which
the property owner transfers property at less than fair market value or transfers
assets into trust in order to keep them out of the bankruptcy proceedings.261
This same principle should also apply in the context of self-settled trusts and
marriage—and does in some states. In Michigan, Hawaii, and Alaska, if the trust
was created within thirty days of the marriage, the trust assets can only be “shielded
against any property settlement if the settlor provides written notice to the spouse
of such funding.”262 This approach shields the non-wealth holding spouse from
unilateral action during wedding planning and preparation, and is an approach all
DAPT states should adopt. Taking this concept further, states could also extend the
timeframe from the one month immediately preceding marriage to the entire period
in which a couple is planning and preparing for marriage. While it would not always
be easy to determine at what point notification would be required, at the very least
notification of the soon-to-be spouse could be required if the couple has become
engaged and is planning to be married.263 Instituting this kind of look-back period
indexed to engagement would mean that individuals using DAPTs as pre-nuptial
agreements would be either forced to disclose the creation of a trust in anticipation
of marriage or to create the trust early enough that there would be no possible fraud
or unwarranted secrecy.
To ensure that DAPTs are not merely vehicles for asset sheltering and that
they serve a legitimate purpose, DAPT states should make sure that economic
partnership rules balance out the enormous power of wealth preservation that these
trusts currently enable.264

259. Under § 2036 (transfers with retained life estate), § 2037 (transfers taking effect at death),
§2038 (revocable transfers), or § 2042 (life insurance).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A).
261. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the look back period is two years. 11 U.S.C. § 548. However,
many states have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), which allows creditors to look
back four years to find a fraudulent conveyance.
262. Brown & Mead, supra note 175, at 3.
263. There is a difficult question here of where to draw the line. However, since the focus here
is marriage planning and marriage settlements, an apt line to draw is at engagement, when there is a
clear agreement between the individuals and an intention to be married. Of course, this might provide
incentives to skip the engagement before the marriage, but this is still the likely better approach than
using either an arbitrary measure of time or delving into questions of nonmarital partnership.
264. Rules developed more generally to instantiate partnership for trusts should still apply as
well. Spouses should, aligned with Uniform Trust Code rules, be considered exception creditors. See
discussion infra.
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CONCLUSION
Family wealth preservation was the longstanding rule of law in marriage. Only
recently have norms changed and, as the idea of marital partnership has gained
traction, the spouse has moved from the shadows of the dower house into the
spotlight. While the idea of economic partnership in marriage has become
increasingly accepted, however, family wealth preservation norms persist. Current
marriage law accommodates the goals of both wealth preservation and economic
partnership by allowing for various forms of wealth preservation but limiting these
forms mostly to third-party interventions, based on the notion of freedom of
disposition. Now, new marriage trusts threaten to undo this carefully composed
arrangement by giving robust asset protection to spouses who create self-settled
trusts during or in anticipation of marriage. Providing new and unparalleled
opportunities for one spouse to shelter assets and defraud the other spouse of
marital property, these new trust forms disrupt the ecology of marital sharing and
financial collaboration, enabling family wealth preservation to annex economic
partnership terrain. Consequently, a renewed focus on rules that limit the ability of
spouses to act unilaterally in marriage to shelter assets and conceal information will
help correct the growing imbalance between the competing value-spheres. Without
a course correction, inequities in the marriage economy will burgeon as marriage
rules absorb family wealth preservation rules, rendering spouses as obstacles and
irritants in the great project of wealth transfer and legacy building.

